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Housing market in China has become an interesting area of investigation during recent 
years. However, most of the studies on China’s housing market focused on policy debate 
and housing choice behavior analysis. Hence, this study seeks to bridge the knowledge gap 
on China’s housing market by providing an understanding on this market, focusing on 
housing supply. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical paper attempting to study on 
the housing supply in China.  
 
First, a framework is established to examine the evolution of the housing market in China 
during the economy’s transition from a central-planned system to a market-oriented one. 
The current status and problems of the housing sector are also discussed. Then, using a 
panel dataset of 50 cities over the 1995-2003 period, a cross-city model based on the study 
of Mayer and Somerville (2000) is designed to estimate new housing supply in China. In 
this model, new housing construction is modeled as a function of changes in house prices, 
changes in building costs and city-specific factors. Finally, the source of differences in 
supply elasticities across cities is explored through a simple cross-sectional model, in 
which the estimated supply elasticities of different cities are explained by a set of variables 
reflecting the stringency of land use regulations.  
 
The empirical results indicate that both the economic development level of a city and the 
city size have strong positive effects on new housing supply while housing construction is 
insensitive to housing price changes. Regional disparity in China’s housing supply is found 
 IV
with cities in the middle region of China having lesser housing construction and lower 
supply elasticities. Further, the results also suggest a negative relationship between land 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Research Background and Motivation 
 
Housing is probably the most valuable asset of individual household and is a significant 
proportion of national wealth. The housing sector has powerful spillover effects on a 
country’s economy and has wide implications for economic efficiency, competitiveness 
and stability (Ball & Grilli, 1997).  Most countries have made housing an important part of 
their policy agenda. For instance, the U.S. government has been persistently enhancing the 
housing market and promoting homeownership through various public programs and tax 
incentives (The Bush Administration, 2002). In China, which accommodates one-fourth 
of the world's population, the housing sector has taken on an added importance. 
  
There had been no organized housing market in China before the 1980s. On assuming 
control in 1949, the Communist state directly took over all responsibilities of the housing 
sector including investment, construction, management and maintenance through local 
housing authorities1  and “work units” (danwei). Most urban residents lived in public 
housing, which was provided by their employers - all kinds of “work units” - as one part of 
the socialistic welfare system.  Housing shortages, substandard quality, and a lack of basic 
facilities were common problems plaguing the urban housing sector. For instance, urban 
per capita living space decreased from 4.5 square meters in the early 1950s to 3.6 square 
                                                 
1 Municipally-managed housing was very limited; only 10% of the state budgetary funding directly went to 
local housing authorities to build or maintain state-owned housing, which, however, was also eventually 
allocated to work units for management (Quan, 2004).  
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meters in the late 1970s (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2001a). Confronted with a 
severe housing shortage in the 1970s, housing reform was initiated by the government as 
one important component of the broad economic reform 2  from a centrally-planned 
economy to a market-oriented one.  
 
After nearly 30 years of reform, a housing market has been established in urban China 
where housing is allocated according to free-market mechanisms as a commodity good. 
Housing production and housing conditions have greatly improved. In 2004, the urban per 
capita living space increased to 13.4 square meters3. During the 18 years from 1986 to 
2004, annual real estate investment grew at an average rate of 35.9% while housing 
investment by the REDCs (Real Estate Development Companies) increased from a 
negligible amount to 883.7 billion Yuan. Currently, as shown in Figure 1.1, there are three 
types of housing in urban China - commodity houses (including affordable houses4), which 
are developed and sold by REDCs for profit, privatized public houses5 , which were 
constructed by the state and sold to individuals during the housing reform and unsold 
public houses. The existing housing stock in the housing market is mainly composed of the 
                                                 
2 After years of economic stagnation and political turmoil, the central government was forced to recognize 
the deficiencies of the old socialist system. Since 1978, economic reforms were started in the country side 
and China has engaged in a gradual transition away from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented 
one. 
3 The average floor space per capita in urban area was 24.97 sq. m in 2004. However, this indicator can not 
reflect the living condition of urban residences since it includes all circular area. Thus, the author converted 
the average floor space per capita into average living space per capita, using the formula suggested by the 
Construction Minister of China, (1 sq. m floor space = 1.87 sq. m living space).  However, the average living 
space per capita may underestimate the real living condition since it didn’t include the kitchen and living 
room area. 
4 The affordable housing is one kind of commodity housing, which is constructed and sold on the market by 
REDCs. Usually, the development of affordable housing is subsidized by the government through exempting 
the land use fee while the government controls the investment profit of developers under 3%.     
5 At first, public housing that was sold could not be transacted freely. Later in 1999, public houses purchased 
by individuals could be transacted in the market.  
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first two types. The housing supply in urban China is dominated by the commodity 
housing, which construction and prices are largely, if not totally, determined by the market. 
 
Figure 1.1 Structure of the Housing Sector in Urban China 
 
Government/ Work Units REDCs 
Commodity housing Privatized public housing 









Marketable housing Non-marketable housing 
(Real Estate Development 
Companies) 
 
Despite China’s general success in developing real estate markets, it has performed 
relatively poorly in one respect: the provision of high-quality housing at reasonable prices. 
The broadest measure of housing “affordability”, the average price to income ratio, is 
much higher than the reasonable level6 in many cities. Calculated with price levels in 2002, 
a 70-square meter flat in Beijing, Tianjin, Nanjing and Dalian costs nearly 10 times a 
                                                 
6 The World Bank pegs the cost of an affordable residence at three to six times of household income. See Liu 
Binyuan and Perry Link’s review of He Qinglian’s Zhongguo De Xianjing[China’s Pitfall], ‘A great leap 
backward’, The New York Review of Books (5 October, 1998). 
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standard household’s (one couple with one child) total annual income. In Shanghai, 
Hangzhou and Wenzhou, the ratios were as high as 12.07, 11.55 and 12.21 respectively 
(Table 1.1). Moreover, commodity housing prices have a continuous rise in the country 
recently.7  
 
Table 1.1 Price to Income Ratio in Selected Cities 
 
City 
Annual income of a 
ordinary 
household(one couple 








Beijing  46914 6232 7.97 9.30 
Shanghai 50049 8627 10.34 12.07 
Tianjin 34401 4760 8.30 9.69 
Hangzhou 43695 7210 9.90 11.55 
Ningbo 47646 5900 7.43 8.67 
Guangzhou 50652 5660 6.70 7.82 
Wenzhou 53181 9278 10.47 12.21 
Xiamen 43329 5156 7.14 8.33 
Nanjing 34806 4960 8.55 9.98 
Qingdao 33267 4639 8.37 9.76 
Suzhou 43353 4460 6.17 7.20 
Dalian 31134 4241 8.17 9.54 
Kunming  27135 3150 6.97 8.13 
Source: Soufun Research Center 2002 Survey 
 
In the United States, as in most countries, the market for housing services can be 
approximated as a competitive market (Green & Malpezzi, 2003). The equilibrium price 
and quantity are determined by the housing demand and supply. In the very short-run, the 
housing supply curve is essentially perfectly inelastic since housing takes time to build. If 
demand shifts out unexpectedly, house prices will increase dramatically because supply is 
                                                 
7 In 2004, according to the official statistic data, the average price was 2549/m2 which increased 16% 
compared with the same period of previous year. In just the first quarter of 2004, 9 of 35 main cities in China 
saw a more than 10% increase of housing price while 7 cities’ land price increased more than 10%.  
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fixed. Over longer periods, as housing is gradually introduced into the market, the supply 
curve rotates downward toward perfect elasticity and prices gradually fall to a new long-
run equilibrium level. The extent of the price response to an unexpected shift in demand is 
determined by the elasticity of housing supply. If supply is inelastic, the price of housing 
will increase dramatically. If supply is elastic, the price of housing will increase only 
slightly.  
 
The response of supply plays an important role in this re-equilibrium process. If the 
housing market is sluggish, when house prices are forced upward by a real shock to 
demand but the long-run equilibrium level is re-achieved slowly, individuals will be priced 
out of the market, leading to an affordability housing crisis in the economy. This is what 
happened during the boom of the 1990s in the U.S. housing market. Hence, learning about 
the characteristics of housing supply response is very important to market analysis and 
policy decision.   
 
The existing literature on supply elasticity mainly focusd on the U.S. and U.K. housing 
markets and the empirical results are mixed. Muth (1960), Follain (1979) and Stover (1986) 
provide evidence of highly elastic housing supply. Other studies provide evidences of less 
than perfectly elastic supply (Poterba, 1984; Blackley, 1999; DiPasquale & Wheaton, 1994; 
Topel & Rosen, 1988; Malpezzi & Maclennan, 2001).  
 
Although such differences are partly due to the different price behavior in different sub-
periods each author studied, several researchers (Malpezzi & Mayo, 1997; Green, 
Malpezzi & Mayo, 1999; Malpezzi & Maclennan, 2001) indicate that there are significant 
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differences in supply elasticity across countries and metropolitan areas, and that these 
differences are caused by the difference in the stringency of the regulation for land and 
housing development. Recent studies follow this approach and get similar results (Bramley, 
1999&2003; Glaser & Gyourko, 2003; Glaser, Gyourko & Saks, 2005). 
 
A rapid increase in academic research and policy debate on China’s housing market has 
occurred in recent years. The housing market in China has become an interesting area of 
investigation, not only because the characteristics of a transitional socialist economy are 
fundamentally different from both the socialist and market economies, but also because the 
special changes from centrally-controlled urban development to a socialist market 
mechanism regime provide a huge learning opportunity in the modern literature of housing 
studies. The housing market in China provides an excellent chance to stretch the context 
that is familiar in the Western literature to an unfamiliar, dynamic, and transitional one. It 
offers a meaningful research field to test the validity of known concepts and to generate 
some new understanding about the phenomenon (Li & Wu, 2004).  
 
To the best of our knowledge, no empirical study of housing supply has been done on 
China. Hence, the purpose of this study is to examine the characteristics of housing supply 
under the mixed economy in China and provide some initial empirical evidence. This will 
be of interest to policy makers, since China still faces a tremendous pent-up demand for 
urban housing, which came from rapid urbanization, and a long period of economic 
prosperity.   
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1.2 Research Objectives 
 
The main objectives of this study are as follows: 
1. To provide an understanding of the evolution of the housing market in China in the 
context of a transitional economy from a centrally-planned to a market-oriented regime. 
2. To examine the current housing system in China. 
3. To explore the determinants of new housing supply in China. 
4. To explore the sources of cross-city differences in the price elasticities of housing 
supply. 
 
1.3 Organization of Study 
 
The thesis is organized into 6 chapters: 
Chapter 1 introduces the research problem by setting out the research background and 
motivation, identifying the research issues and organizing the whole study.   
 
Chapter 2 provides an understanding of the housing market in transitional China. The 
current housing market is established through a series of reforms in the housing provision 
system and land use system. Based on the stock-flow model, a framework is established to 
examine the transition from the old welfare housing provision system to the new market-
oriented one and an overall picture of the current housing market is given. Finally, some 
problems in the development of the housing market are discussed. 
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Chapter 3 reviews the existing literature about the housing supply and supply elasticity 
studies in the U.S. and other countries through examining the various approaches to 
estimate the relationship between housing supply and house prices and related theoretical 
underpinnings. The studies that explore the sources of the differences in supply elasticities 
across cities are also examined.   
 
Chapter 4 presents an empirical estimation of new housing supply in China. First, a cross-
city model of new housing supply is constructed, in which new housing construction is 
described as a function of changes in house prices, changes in construction cost and a 
series of variables capturing the city-specific effects is constructed. Then the data needed 
for the empirical test is described, in terms of data scope, variable selection and data 
sources.  Finally, the empirical results are analyzed. 
 
Chapter 5 provides a simple cross-sectional model for exploring the sources of differences 
in supply elasticities across cities. The price elasticities of housing supply in fifty Chinese 
main cities are calculated and then used to investigate the sources of cross-city variation in 
supply side responses. The variables used in this test are described and the empirical 
results are discussed. 
 
Chapter 6 concludes the study by summarizing the research findings, its implications for 
existing and future research work and the limitation of this study.  
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Chapter 2 Understanding the Housing Market in China 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the development of Chinese housing market during the period of 
economic transition from a centrally-planed system to a market one. This study aims to set 
up a framework for analyzing the housing market and provide a general picture of   its 
development stages. Based on the stock-flow model, emphases of the discussion are placed 
on four issues (i) rent; (ii) investment and construction; (iii) housing finance, and (iv) land 
provision. Structures of housing provision in China are examined in terms of two stages: 
centrally planned era (1949-1978), transitional era (since 1979) according to the 
institutional contexts.  
 
2.2 A stock-flow Model of Housing Supply  
First, a market economy model is introduced which will be used for analyzing the specific 
issues that arise in the housing market of China. Then, a central planning version is 
introduced.  
 
2.2.1 A market Economy Model 
In a market economy, the rental market and asset market are distinguished but connected. 
In the rental market, the real equilibrium rent R* is determined at the level at which the 
demand and supply of housing services are equal. In the housing asset market, the real 
equilibrium price P* is determined at the level at which the demand and supply of the 
housing stock are equal. Meanwhile, the asset price P must equal the discounted value of 
future rents, where the discount rate is determined by the market rate of interest among 
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other factors. There is also a market for the flow of net housing construction. In this market, 
the amount of new housing construction depends on the Tobin Q ratio, which equals the 
ratio of the real asset price P to the real construction cost C. The mortgage market 
influences the housing market through the user cost of capital. Inevitably, an increase in 
the stock demand, will then raise the asset price and housing investment in the short run, 
and will raise the stock of housing in the long run (Jaffee & Kaganova, 1996). 
 
2.2.2 A Central Planning Model 
Under a central planning regime, the housing system in the central planning economy in 
China operated in a very different manner when compared with the market economy. 
There was no housing market in China before the 1980s. Urban housing was provided by 
the state as part of the socialist welfare system. The characteristics of housing provision 
and consumption then can be generalized as follows: 
 
2.2.2.1 Housing Investment and Construction 
The state directly assumed all the responsibilities of the housing sector, including 
investment, construction, management and maintenance, through local housing authorities8 
and work units9. Before 1978, virtually all the housing investment came from the capital 
construction investment (CCI) funds of the state budget (Quan, 2004).  
                                                 
8 Municipally-managed housing was very limited; only 10% of the state budgetary funding went directly to 
local housing authorities to build or maintain state-owned housing, which, however, was also eventually 
allocated to work units for management (Quan, 2004).  
9 A work unit (danwei) generally refers to a specific kind of workplace in the context of state socialism where 
the workplace becomes an extension of the state apparatus and undertakes the function of social organization 
and control. Work units are subject to commands from supervisory government agencies. Their function in a 
planned economy is far beyond that of production organization. Generally, there are four types of workplace 
in urban China: the private sector, the collective sector, state enterprises, and state institutes and agencies. 
The work unit refers to the third and the fourth types, but sometimes also covers the second type because 
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 Almost all the revenues of work units were remitted to the central treasury department and 
then transferred back to local governments and industrial firms according to expenditures 
planned by the government (Zhu, 2002). It was the vertical hierarchy that the supervisory 
departments allocated investment and funds to the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). To 
allocate CCI, the government set up a project- specific method of development 
organization and a planning system based on economic sectors. 
 
With the socialist ideology of ‘production first, consumption second’, housing construction 
and provision were maintained at a minimum level before 1978. Housing investment 
accounted for only 0.78% of GDP on average every year from 1949 to 1978 (State 
Statistics Bureau, 1990). 
 
2.2.2.2 Low Rent 
Most urban residents lived in public housing, which was provided by their employers as 
one part of the socialistic welfare allocation. No lump sum deposit was needed and the 
rents charged were so low that they could not even cover the cost of maintenance since the 
mid- 1950s, let alone the initial investment (Zhang, 1996).  
 
Due to the low rent, housing investment was unable to maintain a sustainable cycle: the 
more the government invested in housing, the more economic burden the government had 
to bear (Yu, 2004). The state was thus reluctant to invest in urban housing. Housing 
                                                                                                                                                    
some large collective enterprises are also controlled by the state. Almost all urban residents worked in state 
work units. In 1978, the non-state sector (private sector) only employed 0.15 million workers nationwide, 
accounting for 0.16 per cent of all urban workers (Wu, 1996). 
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shortages, substandard quality, and lack of basic facilities were common problems 
plaguing the urban housing sector. For instance, urban per capita living space decreased 
from 4.5 square meters in the early 1950s to 3.6 square meters in the late 1970s (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, 2001a). Housing deficiencies reached to a level of crisis 
when a large number of youth returned to the cities after years of reeducation in the 
countryside during the late 1970s and the early 1980s10 (Yu, 2004).  
 
2.2.2.3 Lack of Land Market and Housing Finance
Under the socialist centrally controlled system, property rights over resources were 
nationalized. Throughout China, “the state determined the allocation and utilization of 
resources through directives, rather than by pricing mechanisms” (Zhu, 2002: 43). The fact 
that urban development took place in a period when land was nationalized and 
administratively allocated rather than sold in an open market had a very profound impact 
on the internal organization of Chinese cities. 
 
One of the outcomes was the pattern of land use and resource allocation to the 
development of the built environment. Administrative decisions based on “needs” and 
norms had so far governed the use and quantity of land consumed. Land was 
administratively transferred to the land user by the state. No land rent and time limit were 
required but the land user was not allowed to transact or transfer his land use right.  
 
                                                 
10 During the period of “cultural revolution” (1966-1976), youth in urban area were encouraged to accept 
“reeducation” (labour as the main form) in the rural area. (shangshanxiaxiang) (For more details, see Shen 
and Dong, 2002). When the revolution was terminated, a lot of these youth returned to their hometowns, and 
thus, exacerbated the housing shortages in urban areas. 
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Being located at a peripheral level, the local government was not encouraged to organize 
collective consumption at the municipal level. The vertical linkage between supervisory 
departments and subordinate enterprises made it impossible for the municipality to finance 
unified urban development. Furthermore, the municipality was required to provide urban 
infrastructure and public facilities for the state projects. This resulted in bargaining for 
investment between the central and local administration when a state project was to be 
allocated. 
 
In summary, under the centrally-planed economic system, the state directly controlled 
housing investment, construction, allocation and maintenance. Neither the central nor the 
local governments had incentives to invest in housing since housing was deemed as 
consumption. The housing system suffered serious problems such as housing shortage, 
insufficient investment, unfair distribution, the low rent system and poor management.  
 
In the late 1970s, as an important component of the broad economic reforms, the housing 
reform was initiated to transfer the old welfare housing system to a market-oriented one. A 
housing market in China has been established since then. In the next section, we will 
discuss the economic incentives for the housing market development and examine the new 






2.3 Housing Market in the Transitional China 
In this section, we review the current situation in Chinese urban housing markets. We 
begin with the arousing of economic incentives for housing supply, and introduce the 
current status of housing market. 
 
2.3.1 Economic Incentives 
2.3.1.1 Economic Reform and Power Restructuring
In the 1970s, severe fiscal deficits were experienced by local governments in carrying out 
urban development. Economic reforms were thus initiated to restructure the administrative 
and financial relationships between central and local governments and promote economic 
growth. Administrative power was decentralized to local governments such as power of 
examination and approval of fixed asset investment projects; power of distribution; power 
of foreign trade and exchange administration; power of price control; and power of payroll 
adjustment. Besides, preferential policies were also granted to the special economic zones 
(e.g. Shengzhen) and open coastal cities (e.g. Shanghai). This administrative 
decentralization has significantly decreased the direct control of the central government on 
local development (Leaf, 1995). It gave decision-making power to agents (local 
governments and SOEs) who began to pursue their own interests (Pryor, 1973; Reeve, 
1986; Zhu, 2002). The force of decentralization of the administrative and economic 
decision-making had transferred China’s local governments into local states with a strong 
interest in development and active actors responsible for local prosperity (Zhu, 2004b). 
With the introduction of economic reforms, China has experienced continued GDP growth 
at a remarkable rate of about 9 per cent per annum on average (see Figure 2.1). 
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Source: State Statistics Bureau, various years 
 
 
Along with the rapid economic development, the income of citizens increased significantly 
in urban areas. From 1978 to 1989, the average annual income per capita increased from 
343 to 1374 Yuan11. Economic growth also resulted in an unprecedented increase in the 
urban population and the level of urbanization (see Figure 2.2). 14.3 million people were 
urbanized annually on average, and the total urban population grew by 371.9 million from 
1978 to 2004 (SSB, 2004). At the same time that China became more urbanized, household 
composition had also undergone marked changes. Fewer large extended families live as 
one household, and more nuclear households exist, especially in urban areas. For example, 
the average urban household size was 3.55 in 1989, but fell to 3.01 in 200312. This rapid 





                                                 
11 These are in nominal price. Using 1978 as the base year, the income index is 514.6 in 1989. The average 
annual growth rate between 1978 and 2003 was 6.8% and 7.7% between 1990 and 2003. 
12 Part of the decrease could be due to a slow down in birthrates. 
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Total Population(million) Urban Population(million) Urban Share in Total Population(%) 
 
Source: State Statistics Bureau, various years 
 
 
In addition to the rapid growth in urban population, number of households and incomes, 
the countrywide redevelopment program also significantly drove housing demand. Along 
with the countrywide economic reform, the local government, of which the housing bureau 
forms an integral part, has a substantial interest in redeveloping the old, yet strategically 
located, housing stock, to realize the rent gap between the potential and existing use of 
such land parcels (Wu, 1997). Besides renovating old dwellings, the introduction of the 
land-lease system and the construction of massive infra-structure projects, including urban 
highways and metro systems, have led to the large-scale reconstruction of inner-city 
neighborhoods in many Chinese cities. Take Shanghai for example13. In 1991, a survey 
organized by the municipal government announced that in total, Shanghai had 3.65 million 
m2 of dilapidated houses scattered in the old city proper (Gu and Liu, 1997; Wu and Li, 
2002). The government set up a target to demolish these dilapidated houses. In 2002, the 
                                                 
13 The exact data are not available on the country level. 
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Social Development Bluebook of Shanghai reported that the city had successfully 
accomplished the task (Yi and Lu, 2002). 
 
2.3.1.2 Housing Reform and Housing Commoditization 
 
During the 1980s, the problems of a public-sector-dominated housing system such as 
housing shortage, insufficient investment, unfair distribution, the low rent system and poor 
management became a major topic of discussion (Wang & Murie, 1996). The housing 
reform was thus also initiated by the government as one important component of the 
broader economic reform from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented one. 
Unlike the “big bang” reforms by the Soviet Union and some East European counties, the 
housing reform in China was carried out step by step to establish housing markets and 
increase housing provision (Shaw, 1997). 
 
In the 1980s (the first stage), the government performed various experiments to shift new 
housing provision from employers to the market in selected cities (Wang and Murie 1999a, 
2000). In this housing commoditization schemes practiced in several cities for testing; 
individuals paid one-third of the construction costs for a residential unit with the 
government and the buyer’s work-unit each paying an equal share of the outstanding 
balance (Wu & Yeh, 1997). The money paid by the individual was collected by the state 
and then invested in new housing projects. 
 
Later in 1988, the central government tried to establish the housing market all over the 
country through extending housing reform from pilot tests to overall implementation in all 
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urban areas14 (see Table 2.1). The state council required all urban authorities to carry out 
housing reforms according to their local social and economic conditions. A national 
housing market has been firmly established.  
 
However, this gradual reform process results in a dual-housing system, which represents 
the strong inheritance and influence of past institutions on the reform path. One segment of 
this dual system is the SOEs, which continue to provide the majority of housing to its 
employees. The old housing provision system was not completely terminated and the links 
between housing provision and employment still existed. On the one hand, work units sold 
their existing stock to employees at a heavily subsidized price. On the other hand, work 
units continued their house-building program or purchased new housing from the 
commercial sector at full market prices and distributed them to their employees at 
discounted prices. The other segment is the private housing sector, which operates in a 
more open housing market.  
 
The existing of dual housing system caused many problems. First, since the purchasing 
power of work units is much greater than that of individuals, the involvement of work units 
in the housing market led to the rocketing of housing prices, which made most people 
unable to afford housing on their own. 
 
                                                 
14 At the beginning of 1988, the central government held the first national housing reform conference which 
discussed the Yantai experiments and set up national housing reform principles and objectives. As a result of 
the conference, the State Council issued the “Implementation Plan for a Gradual Housing System Reform in 
Cities and Towns”. This marked the turning point of housing reform from pilot tests and experiments in 
selected cities to overall implementation in all urban areas. However, this plan was not carried out in all 
urban areas until 1991due to the high inflation rate and political unrest. 
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Second, household choices were constrained because of the transitional nature of the dual 
housing system where both institutional forces and market mechanisms operate. In the 
1990s, urban households in China, who had few housing choices but to wait for subsidized 
rental housing (also ‘public housing’, gong fang) in the socialist era, had choices regarding 
both housing type and tenure. However, in the same time, the housing behavior was 
influenced by institutional relationships among households, “work units” and the 
government. And the demand for private housing was inevitable depressed by this 
influence (Wang & Li , 2004;  Huang , 2003 & 2004; Michael & Kwong, 2002;    Huang & 
Clark, 2002).   
 
Besides, housing inequality was on the rise. People who were at a disadvantage in the 
socialist housing system, continued to be discriminated in the merging housing market 
(Huang 2003a). The cause of this horizontal inequity is that most urban housing supply 
continues to be closely linked with various work units, the work units continue to construct 
housing and sell it to their employees, and the privatisation of public housing was 
completed only within each individual work unit. The differences in economic conditions 
among various work units lead to differences (or horizontal inequity) in housing 
consumption among employees. In the reform era, these economic differences have 
become larger as a result of the introduction of markets and the withdrawal of the 
government from most economic activities, and thus housing inequity has worsened (Zhao 
& Bourassa, 2003). 
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The development of the housing market was relatively slow in the second stage due to the 
dual systems of housing provision. Therefore, new policies were introduced in 1998 to end 
direct housing distribution by work units15. 
 
Since 1998, the development of the housing market in China has stepped into the third 
stage (see Table 2.1). The old housing provision system was completely abandoned, and 
this strongly accelerated the development of the housing market since people could only 
obtain houses from the market. Besides, home mortgages, in terms of housing provident 
fund mortgages, commercial bank mortgages and combined mortgages (of the two) began 
to expand at an accelerating rate since 199816. The availability of housing finance also 
greatly facilitated the development of the housing market. Moreover, the secondary 
housing market has also been developed since 1999, when public housing purchased by 
individuals could be transacted in the market. 
Table 2.1 Progress of Housing Reforms in China 
 
Time Measures Comments 
1979-
1982 
Sale of new houses at building 
cost 
First in Xi’an and Nanning, then extended to 
more than 60 cities. 
1982-
1985 
Subsidized sale Tested in four cities: Zhengzhou, Changzhou, 
Siping and Shashi 
1986-
1988 
Raise rent to promote sales of 
public-sector housing( new 
and old) 
Tried in Yantai 
1988  
Paid transfer of land use 
rights was made official 
 
z A Nation wide reform plan was issued in 1988 
(State Council No.11) but not carried out in all 
urban areas due to the high inflation rate and 
political unrest.  
z Provided the platform on which commodity 
                                                 
15 The employers were allowed to issue housing cash subsidies to their employees but not be directly 
involved in housing construction, distribution and management. Urban residents can use this allowance, 
together with their savings, housing provident funds and bank loans to buy their dwelling in the private 
housing market according to their own needs and economic capability. Thus, the work units’ direct control 
over the housing distribution was removed. 
16 By August 2002, the total outstanding balance of the residential mortgages reached RMB Yuan 763 billion, 
a 34 fold increase compared to the balance at the end of 1997 (Deng, 2005). 
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housing could develop. 
z The constitution was amended in 1988. Public 
land leasing by auction, tender and negotiation 
was legalized so that urban land could be leased to 
developers or users for a fixed period after a 
payment of rent in a lump sum to the state 





Sales of existing public-sector 
housing to the sitting tenants 
 
z Reform was required in every city since 1991 
(GOSC, No. 730). 
z In 1994, further reform was required. (State 
Council No.43) 
z The main reason behind the selling of public 
houses is it provided the government large 
amounts of capital, which were necessary for 
further housing investment to solve the housing 
shortage. 
 Increase rents of public-sector 
housing 
 
By 2000, rents were increased gradually to levels 
which covered basic construction and 
maintenance costs plus investment interest and 
property tax. In the long term, beyond 2000, the 
aims are to rationalize rents to the market level 
taking into account the costs of building, repair, 
management, investment interest, property tax, 
land-use fees, insurance and profit. 
 Establishing the Housing 
Provident  Fund 
 
Developed first in late 1991 in Shanghai based on 
the Singapore model and extended nationwide in 
1995. The savings could only be used for housing 
purposes but would also be available as an 
addition to a pension when the employee retires. 
The start rate of saving 17  and the date were 
allowed to vary among work units to reflect their 
particular financial situation. 
 
 Encouraging the construction 
of Commodity housing 
As early as in 1984, the State Council issued 
“Temporary Regulations Involving the systematic 
reform of the Administration of the Construction 
Industry” which directed that “urban real estate 
development companies (REDCs) should be 
formed to carry out the comprehensive 
development of urban land and housing” and that 
these REDCs would act as business enterprises 
largely responsible for their profits and losses. 
1998 Direct housing distribution by 
employers should be stopped 
by the end of 1998 
 
Introducing housing cash 
subsidies 
z This marked the end of welfare housing (State 
Council No.23) 
z A transitional period till the end of 1999 was 
given to work units to deal with the housing under 
construction or purchase contracts till the end of 
1999. 
                                                 
17 The initial rate of contribution was set at 10 per cent of an employee’s salary (shared between employer 
and employee), which were increased to 16 per cent by 2003. 
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 z Employers were allowed to issue housing 
subsidies to their employees. Urban residents are 
given cash allowances to partially cover their 
housing costs. They can use the allowance, 
together with their savings, housing provident 
funds and bank loans, to buy their dwellings in the 
private housing market according to their own 
needs and economic capability. 
z From 1999, all new employees and existing 
employees who had not been allocated houses 
would receive a housing cash subsidy of 66% of 
their salaries. This money would be paid into the 
employee’s housing funds.   
 Creating a diversified housing 
supply system with state-
supported affordable (low-
cost) commercial housing as 
the main form 
 
The key differences between affordable housing 
and ordinary commercial housing are the way in 
which the land is allocated and the government 
control of the profit made by the developers. For 
any affordable housing projects approved by the 
local authority, the land would be 
administratively allocated without charging for 
land use. The investment profits for the 
developers were controlled at a level of no more 
than 3%.  
 Setting up a new housing 
finance system to help 
developers and individuals 
with loans and mortgages to 
facilitate the urban housing 
market 
The first residential mortgage loan in China was 
issued by China Construction Bank (CCB) in 
1986. There are three categories of residential 
mortgages in China: housing provident fund 
mortgages, commercial bank mortgages, and 
combined mortgages (of the two). The People’s 
Bank of China decided to reduce the interest rates 
on home mortgages and to extend the period of 
loan for commercial housing (including 
affordable housing) from 20 years to 30 years in 
November 1999. 
1999 Public housing purchased by 
individuals could be 
transacted with certain 
conditions in the market 
The seller must have the certificate of property 
ownership. If the property was bought at a price 
lower than the cost, then extra money must be 
submitted after selling the house. 
Source: Author’s survey 
 
 
2.3.2 Current Status of Transitional Housing Market 
After more than two decades of reform, a market-oriented housing system has been 
established in China. The main changes of this system, compared with the previous one, 
are examined below. 
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 2.3.2.1 Housing Investment and Construction 
The major structural changes in housing investment and construction came after the 
introduction of commercial development when the real estate development companies or 
REDCs were founded. In 1984, the State Council issued “Temporary Regulations 
Involving the Systematic Reform of the Administration of the Construction Industry” 
which directed that “urban real estate development companies should be formed to carry 
out the comprehensive development of urban land and housing” and that these REDCs 
would act as business enterprises largely responsible for their profits and losses (World 
Bank, 1993). Since then, many real estate development companies have been established 
and there were 37,123 active real estate enterprises in the country till the end of 2003. 
Annual housing starts and completions by real estate development companies kept growing, 
reaching 479.5 and 346.8 million square meters respectively in 2004 (See Figure 2.3). 
From 1997 to 2003, a total of 1,127 million square meters of land had been developed and 
1,864 million sq. meter floor space of residential buildings had been built by real estate 
development companies. Housing provision was no longer the obligation of government 
and work units. Commodity housing development became a dominant mode of housing 
production (Quan, 2004). 
 
However, work units were still allowed to provide housing (through self construction or 
buying commodity housing on the market) for workers until 1998. Since 1998, commodity 
housing construction by real estate developers became the sole means of housing provision 
since the work units were not allowed to be directly involved in housing construction, 
distribution and management. 
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Floor Space of Housing Starts Floor Space of Housing Completion
 
*Data is not available before 1997. 
Source: State Statistics Bureau, various years 
 
 
Similar with the construction, investment resource of housing supply is diversified. The 
increase of housing investment mainly came from the growth in investment by REDCs 
(See Figure 2.4).  Especially after 1998, housing investment by REDCs increased greatly 
while investment by others (government institutions and non-profit organizations) showed 
a flat, even decreasing trend. In 2004, the housing investment by REDCs was 843.7 billion 
Yuan, which accounted for about 80% of the total housing investment. This indicates that 
through the housing reform, a market-oriented housing provision system has been 
established. The market-oriented commercial housing development attracted investment 
from various sources. In 2004, 18.4% of the commodity housing investment came from 
loans, 30.3% from self-raised funds18 and 1.4 % from foreign investment. Others sources 
                                                 
18 Self-raised funds refer to “funds received by construction enterprises from their responsible institutes, local 
governments, and within enterprises for the purpose of investment in fixed assets” (State Statistical Bureau, 
1996: 197).  
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such as deposits and advanced payments by home purchasers accounted for 49.8% (State 
Statistics Bureau, 2004). 





















Housing Investment by Real Estate Development Co.
Housing investment by others
REDCs share in total investment
 
Source: State Statistics Bureau, various years 
 
The self-raised funds are usually raised by local governments and enterprises19, and the 
fund-raisers could decide the allocation of such monies beyond the central plan. The 
emergence of SRF broke the traditional budgetary control over development and 
investment20. The government’s control over the scale and pattern of housing investment 
has been largely reduced. The proportion of state budgetary funds in total housing 
investment decreased to merely 0.06 percent while before 1978, virtually all housing 
investment came from the capital construction investment funds of the state budget (Quan, 
2004). 
 
                                                 
19 Since 1980, the state relaxed control over the use of work unit’s surplus and their funds. This result that 
work units channeled increasing amount funds to housing investment. 
20 In 1978, the state budget accounted for 62.2 percent of the total investment in fixed assets. In 1992, SRF 
accounted for 51.2 per cent of the total investment in fixed assets, whereas only 4.3 percent came from state 
investment throughout the whole country (State Statistics Bureau, 1992). 
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  Source: State Statistics Bureau, various years 
 
 
After the initiation of housing reforms, there was a boom in housing investment in the late 
1980s and 1990s (see Figure 2.5). Since 1978, total real estate investment increased 
significantly. During the 18 years from 1986 to 2004, real estate investment grew at an 
annual rate of 36%, which is much higher than the GDP growth (9.6 % per annum) and the 
fixed asset investment growth (19.8% per annum). 
 
2.3.2.2 Increasing Rent 
Housing rents have been increased gradually in the public sector through rent reform. By 
the year 2000, rents in the public sector had been increased to levels which covered basic 
construction and maintenance costs plus investment interest and property tax. Beyond 
2000, the aims of rent reform were to rationalize rents to the market level taking into 
account the costs of building, repair, management, investment interest, property tax, land-
use fees, insurance and profit (General Office of the State Council, 1991). There were two 
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main reasons for doing so. First, rents in the past were so low that payments were largely 
symbolic. In most cases, rents were not enough to cover the necessary repairs and 
maintenance of the dwellings. Second, the very low level of rent has been a major factor 
creating the low demand for commodity housing purchase. 
 
2.3.2.3 Housing Finance 
The housing provident fund (developed first in late 1991 in Shanghai based on the 
Singapore model and extended nationwide in 1994) was introduced to ensure that wage 
increases were used for housing purposes. Public-sector employers and employees were 
each required to make a monthly contribution to the employee’s housing saving account. 
The savings could only be used for housing purposes but would also be available as an 
addition to a pension when the employee retires. The starting rate of saving21 and the date 
were allowed to vary between work units to reflect their particular financial situation. 
(Beijing Municipal Government 1994)  
 
In addition to the housing provident fund, mortgages were made available for home 
purchases. The first residential mortgage loan in China was issued by the China 
Construction Bank (CCB) in 1986. Home mortgages are encouraged to improve home 
ownership. There are three categories of residential mortgages in China: housing provident 
fund mortgage, commercial bank mortgage, and combined mortgage (of the two). To 
encourage borrowing, the government reduced the bank interest rate seven times between 
                                                 
21 The initial rate of contribution was set at 10 per cent of an employee’s salary (shared between employer 
and employee), which was increased to 16 per cent by 2003. 
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1996 and 1999 and adjusted the terms and conditions22 on mortgage borrowing in the hope 
of pushing the urban housing market forward. A 20% tax on bank interest payments was 
also introduced in 1999 to encourage spending. Residential mortgage lending began to 
expand at an accelerating rate since 1998 in line with reforms aiming to end state-
controlled welfare housing. By August 2002, the total outstanding balance of the 
residential mortgages reached RMB Yuan 763 billion, a 34-fold increase compared to the 
balance at the end of 1997 (Deng, 2005). 
 
2.3.2.4 Land Provision 
Since 1988, land reform has been carried out to support the market-oriented housing 
supply. The separation of land use rights from the land ownership was introduced (Hu, 
1995). In 1988, the Seventh People’s Congress amended Clause 4 of Article 10 of the 
constitution and for the first time made the paid transfer of land use rights official. The 
paid transfer of land use rights is equivalent to land leasing as exclusive rights to use land, 
to derive income from land and to transfer land are granted to the land user within a period 
(Cheung, 1982; Lai, 1995). Public land leasing by auction, tender and negotiation has been 
legalized so that urban land can be leased to developers or users for a fixed period after a 
payment of rent in a lump sum to the state (Xu, 2001; Zhu, 2004a). Land has become a 
commodity. The rediscovery of the value of urban land has led to spatial restructuring in 
the central areas in the pursuit of maximum land use efficiency (Yeh & Wu, 1996). 
 
                                                 
22 China’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China, decided to reduce the interest rates on home mortgages 
and to extend the period of loan for commercial housing (including affordable housing) from 20 years to 30 
years in November 1999. 
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Urban reform also stipulated that the state – which in reality was the local municipality for 
each city – monopolized the land leasing (Wu, 1998). The municipality acted as the legal 
authority of urban development through the operation of land markets. Unified land 
acquisition by the municipal government was initiated. Government officials often pursued 
local economic growth as measured by increases in GDP as symbols of political 
achievement. As urban development contributed a lot to GDP growth, there is a trend for 
the government towards the development interests. As land leasing became a critical 
revenue source for the capital-hungry local government, the local government was keen on 
leasing out as much land as possible to generate revenue for infrastructure construction. 
 
Although the local municipality monopolized land leasing, it did not control all land 
transfers. A large amount of land was occupied by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
statutory institutional users, which acquired land on an administration/free allocation basis. 
Based on the socialist land use system in China, the government could not retrieve the land 
from existing land users. It was not until the SOE reforms when SOEs started to relocate to 
the urban periphery that there was redevelopment of the land they occupied. 
 
2.3.2.5 Government Regulations on Property Development 
Of particular importance in housing supply in China are government regulations on 
property development. During the transformation process, there were formal and informal 
regulations on housing development. The formal rules mainly included various 
government regulations of property development (see Appendix A). First, land utilization 
and all development within a planned area must conform to the urban development 
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planning23 and be subject to planning management (Ministry of Construction 1990, 8). 
Developers must get the approval on the site selection from the urban planning department 
before applying for the approval on their project design guidelines. A real estate developer 
needs various permits from at least six main government departments (not including the 
branches) before starting project building, not to mention the additional requirements by 
different local government and administration bureaus. It will take a long time to get all the 
permits and this restrains the supply response. What should be noticed is that government’s 
uneven power over development leads to the behavior of rent seeking. Without good 
relationship with the government, it is hard to get the land permit and other certificates 
even if all the standards were met and despite a long waiting period. Thus, these various 
government regulations on property development may delay or reduce housing 
construction. 
 
2.4 Some Current Problems in the Housing Market 
 
2.4.1 Low Affordability 
Despite China’s general success in economic and housing development, it has performed 
relatively poorly in one respect: the provision of high quality housing at reasonable prices.  
                                                 
23Government uses urban development planning to control the land use and the location of major projects 
within the urban area in next 20 (Master planning) or 5 years (Detailed planning). Generally, development 
codes such as plot size, layout of facilities, density and building height are set.   
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The housing affordability can be assessed, frequently, by the ratio approach: the ratio of 
housing price to household income or the ratio of housing rental to household income. 
They are the most commonly used yardsticks of housing affordability24.   
 
According to World Bank standards, in market economies an affordable housing price 
should be no more than three to six times a family’s annual income, i.e., the price to 
income ratio should be no more than 3:1 to 6:1 (China Real Estate News, 30 October 2002; 
China Daily Hong Kong Edition, 1 August 2001). The Final Report published by The 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Institute of Finance and Trade Economics (IFTE) 
and The Institute of Public Administration (IPA) (1996, p. 144) gives the ratio of 2:1 to 7:1 
as being desirable, while Yuan (1998, p. 5) suggests a ratio between 2:1 and 6:1, 
depending on the city and location concerned, as being appropriate. 
 
However, the average price to income ratio in China is much higher than what is deemed a 
reasonable level. The housing prices are often 10-20 times a family’s total income in the 
late 1990s25. The situation did not change even in the 2000s, as indicated in previous 
chapter (page 5). Duda, Zhang and Dong (2005) also indicated that urban Chinese pay high 
fractions of their income for housing. For example, for middle-income households, the 
                                                 
24 For example, Hui (2001) has used it to analyse housing affordability in Hong Kong; Liu has made use of it 
to study urban housing in China; and Chaplin and Freeman have applied the measure to examine housing in 
England. In fact, the PIR is one of 10 key housing indicators approved by the United Nations Commission on 
Human Settlements (UNCHS) (United Nations, 2003, Chap. 7; Malpezzi & Mayo, 1997, pp. 3–4). 
 
25 Rosen and Ross (2000) 
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annual mortgage payment plus other housing expense was about 38-42 percent of their 
annual income; for upper-middle income households, this rate was 30-33 percent. 
 
A series of subsidized housing programs have been launched to fix this problem, such as 
the economical and comfortable housing (Jingji Shiyong Fang ) schemes, hardship housing 
solving schemes and the low-rent housing schemes. Among those measures, the 
economical and comfortable housing is the government’s primary housing program to 
improve housing affordability. The policy is designed for lower-middle- and middle-
income urban residents and involves government subsidies and profit caps for developers. 
The primary subsidy vehicle making the program possible is administrative allocation of 
state-owned land at no cost. Projects are also often subsidized by the reduction in 
development costs and fees paid to local government. Developer profits are limited to three 
percent and units are generally smaller than commercial apartments to maintain 
affordability. Actual selling prices are supposed to be checked to ensure that they remain 
below agreed upon thresholds in order to avoid capture of the subsidy by developers. Till 
now, government has invested enormously in it through the combined revenue forgone by 
land donation, reduced taxes and fees, and subsidized construction loans (Sun, 2004). 
 
However, although the housing in economic and comfortable housing projects is priced 
substantially lower than market rates, it remains out of reach for most households (Wang, 
2001; Sun, 2004; Zhan, 2003). For example, in Beijing, the primary qualification standards 
for the program set by government include: local residence registration; first time buyers or 
households officially defined as facing housing poverty; and income below ¥60,000 
annually (Ministry of Construction 2004). However, according to the figures from the 
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Beijing Municipal Bureau, the mean annual incomes of the upper-middle-income group 
were put at ¥43, 581. That means, despite the policy’s intent to reach lower-middle-income 
first –time buyer households, the annual income threshold of ¥60,000 actually makes most 
upper-middle-income household eligible (Sun, 2004).  
 
Besides, qualification criteria may not be strictly monitored. For example, applicants with 
multiple sources of income find it easy to qualify by presenting pay slips from only one 
source. Tomba’s (2004a, 2004b) interviews with residents of one project in Beijing found 
that neither income limits nor rules prohibiting existing owners from buying Jingji Shiyong 
Fang housing were enforced. 
 
Generally speaking, given that developer incentives favor bending the rules to qualify as 
many potential customers as possible, effective monitoring would seem to be quite difficult. 
(Duda, Zhang & Dong, 2005)Other housing scheme targeted more directly at lower-
income households, such as the down payment assistance program, may need to be 
considered. 
 
2.4.2 Low Mobility 
Similar to some other developing countries where housing used to be bureaucratically 
allocated tended, the mobility of the Chinese homeowners is low. Recently with housing 
privatization, the residential mobility rate has shown a sharp increase in Moscow and other 
East European cities. However, in China, two decades of housing and economic reforms 
were not accompanied by a corresponding rise in residential mobility, at least according to 
the gross mobility rate computed by Li (2004). Based on retrospective histories of a sample 
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of household heads in Beijing, Li obtained an average residential mobility rate of 4.29% 
per annum over the period 1980 to 2001. This rate is much lower than the residential 
mobility rates prevailing in the United States26. There are two main reasons for this low 
mobility. One is that, to head off speculation, the government generally required Chinese 
homeowners to own a home (privatized public houses) for at least 5 years and to possess a 
valid “ownership certificate” 27 before they can sell it. Although the restrictions were 
loosened since 1999 in some places, they are still a factor in many housing markets around 
the country. The other reason is the “work units” still play an important role in housing 
provision through self-building or buying houses from the market and allocating to their 
employers at preferential prices (Logan, Bian & Bian, 1999; Zhao & Bourassa, 2003).  
Although this direct housing allocation was terminated in 1999, completely untying the 
relationship between the “work units” and the individual’s residence still needs time. 
 
2.4.3 Regional Disparity 
 
While the nationwide growth rate was impressive, the pace of reform and growth has been 
uneven across regions (Xu & Wang, 1997). In particular, coastal regions grew more 
rapidly than middle and west regions. Referring to Figure 2.6, during 1978–1997, the GDP 
per capita in the coastal provinces grew at 10% p.a., while in the central provinces, it was 
at 8.4%. The provinces in the remote western region had an even lower growth rate at 
7.4%, which is 2.6 percentage points below that of the coastal provinces (Bao et al, 2002). 
Numerous empirical studies have also been done to identify factors for the regional 
                                                 
26 In the United States, roughly 20% of the population change residence every year. Although declined some-
what in recent years, the rate remained at 17.5% for the 1980 Population Census, which ignored multiple 
moves (Long, 1992). 
27  Full property rights, which allow unrestricted resale, are rare since the public housing was sold to 
individuals at discounted prices (Rosen & Rose, 2000). 
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disparity, among which the main factors are poor economic basis, lack of capital, low 
quality of education, closed culture, economic policy, and poor natural conditions of the 
interior provinces, etc. (Chang, 1995; Li, 1995; DeMurger, 2000; Fleisher & Chen, 1997; 
Lee, 2000; Song, Chu, & Chao, 2000). 
 




Source: Bao et al, 2002: 91 
 
 
Due to the uneven pace of reform and growth in different regions, increasing regional 
disparity has been observed during the development of the housing market in China (Xu & 
Wang, 1997).  In 1999, the share of the east (coastal) region in the total housing investment 
was about 75%, much higher than that of the western and middle regions. However, since 
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1999, as a result of the western area development policy28, the GDP growth rates in the 
western region have been above the country average level. The development of its housing 
market has also been accelerated. In 2000, the housing investment increased by 36.05% 
from 1999. During 2000-2003, the average annual growth rate in housing investment was 
more than 20% in the western region. Presently, the western region possesses the second 
highest housing investment share in the GDP, while the coastal and middle region has the 




This chapter provides a framework for analyzing the Chinese housing market during the 
period of economic transition from a centrally-planed system to a market one. Within this 
framework we discuss the achievements of housing market from the economic transition 
and also some problems. Through the process of a series of government-initiated reforms, 
the housing market is evolving with special characteristics in economic incentives, housing 
investment, housing construction, housing finance and land provision. It was not until the 
1990s that the country-wide development of housing market started. However, in the 
1990s, the existence of dual systems allowed old institutions to continue functioning in the 
emerging housing market. Work units, as the units to distribute social welfare, kept on 
providing housing for their workers. Housing provision and consumption are thus 
influenced by the old system and manifested by the unmatched housing price and 
household’s income. Since 1998, the market has become the sole method for housing 
provision and consumption. Housing prices should have become more sensitive to the 
change in household income. However, the price to income ratio is still high. Another 
                                                 
28 In 1999, the state issued a series of policies to accelerate the development of the western region. 
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problem that emerged during the development of the housing market is the disparity 
among different regions with investment and construction focused in coastal areas. So far, 
existing literature of Chinese housing market focused on the policy debate and housing 
choice behavior analysis29. No empirical work has been done on the housing supply. In the 
following chapters, we will perform an empirical study to explore the factors that influence 











                                                 
29 The literature of policy debate has been discussed in this chapter. And the existing literature about housing 
choice behavior in China is briefly reviewed in Appendix B.  
 37
Chapter 3 Literature review 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a review of the housing supply literature. Our empirical study will 
focus on two aspects: exploring the determinants of new housing supply and examining the 
cross-city differences in supply elasticities. The literature review of these two aspects is 
detailed below. For the study of new housing supply, basically two approaches—reduced 
form and structural form – are used in the existing literature. Then, the literature that 
examines the relationship between land regulation and supply elasticity is reviewed since 
this is the focus of most studies exploring the differences in supply elasticities.  
 
3.2 New Housing Supply  
Due to the durability of residential buildings, housing supply is determined not only by the 
production decisions of builders of new units but also by the decisions made by owners of 
housing (and their agents) concerning conversion of the existing stock of housing 
(Dipasquale, 1999). However, this section will focus on exploring the studies of new 
housing supply30. There are two basic approaches to estimate the relationship between 
housing supply and house prices: reduced form estimation where generally price is a 
function of supply and demand factors and more structural approaches where aggregate 
supply is estimated directly with construction as a function of price and cost shifters.  
 
                                                 
30  For the determinants of renovation and repair decisions, please see Rydell (1982), Potepan (1989), 
Gyourko and Linneman (1990), Bogdon (1992) and  Montgomery (1992) or turn to DiPasquale (1999) and 
Bramley et al. (1999) for discursive reviews( the former focusing on the U.S. literature and the latter 
including a wider range of countries, including Britain). 
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3.2.1 Reduced Form Estimation 
Many early studies used the reduced form regression and the price elasticity of starts is 
derived from the coefficients on supply and demand shifters. Muth (1960) is the first 
econometric examination of the supply side of the U.S. housing market.  Muth regressed 
the real value of new construction against the relative price of housing and input prices, 
and also estimated an inverted model with housing prices on the left-hand side. In both 
cases, Muth found no significant relationship between price and quantity, consistent with 
elastic supply. However, Muth limited his investigation to the interwar years 1919–1934. 
Following Muth, Follain (1979) estimated a series of similar regressions, using postwar 
data (1947–1975) and examining issues of simultaneity and serial correlation. Follain 
found qualitatively similar results, consistent with elastic supply. 
 
Olsen (1987) pointed out that both Muth’s and Follain’s studies included input prices on 
the right-hand side. Olsen (pp. 1017–1018) viewed this as a misspecification, arguing that 
in general the relationship between supply and input prices should be independent of 
whether the supply curve is elastic or rising. He further noted that the inclusion of 
extraneous variables does not generally bias results, but may reduce efficiency. 
 
Malpezzi and Maclennan (1996) estimated a reduced-form equation taking this point into 
account; housing quantity was on the right-hand side, but input prices were not. They 
estimated supply elasticities for the United States that range from four to thirteen 
depending on the specification. 
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More recently Blackley (1999) estimated several models that were broadly similar to 
Follain’s. She used a time span longer than that of most other papers reviewed here, 
namely 1950 to 1994. Like Follain, Blackley initially included input prices on the right-
hand side of her specification, but she also tested Olsen’s recommended sparser 
specification. Blackley’s estimates of supply elasticities ranged from 1.6 to 3.7. 
 
Malpezzi and Maclennan (2001) estimated the price elasticity of supply of housing from 
new construction separately for the United States and for the United Kingdom, building on 
a model originally developed by Steve Mayo. They considered four related tests31 of the 
price elasticity of supply and presented results in their paper from three of them. Post 
World War II, housing price in the United States was essentially flat, albeit with very large 
cycles while in the UK, relative housing prices generally rose. According to the flow 
model, the implied price elasticity was between 4 and 10 in the prewar United States and 
was between 6 and 13 postwar. In prewar UK the implied price elasticity was between 1 
and 4; postwar it was between 0 and 1. Stock adjustment models yielded different price 
elasticities ranging from 1 to 6 for the United States, and from 0 to 1 for the UK. Different 
regulatory and financial environments of the U.S. and UK housing markets were used to 
explain the differences in the estimated parameters.  
 
Generally, the models with the induced form method have one shortage: it can not provide 
the direct estimation of the supply elasticity. The elasticity is implied by or transformed 
                                                 
31 The first test is about whether there was a trend in the relative price; the second followed the model by 
Muth (1960) and Follain (1979); the third was a flow model based on the study of Malpezzi and Mayo (1996) 
and the fourth was a stock adjustment model extended on the third one.  
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from the relationship between price and quantity. Besides, these models were easy to suffer 
the misspecification problem (Olsen, 1987). Thus, from the 1980s, there have been several 
attempts to directly model housing supply. 
 
3.2.2 Estimations of Structural Approaches 
The theoretical underpinnings of much of this literature came from one of two sources: the 
investment literature or the literature on urban spatial theory. The main difference in these 
two approaches was the treatment of land as an input in the production of new housing. 
The studies that were based on the investment literature tended to ignore the unique 
characteristics of land as a factor of production, while those based on urban spatial theory 
explicitly incorporated the land market into the theoretical structure (DiPasquale, 1999). 
 
Poterba (1984) took an asset market approach to modeling the housing market, examining 
the impact of a shock to the steady state and mapping out the adjustment process to a new 
steady state. The home-building industry was assumed to be composed of competitive 
companies and the aggregate supply was assumed to depend on its output price, the real 
price of housing structures. If there were limits to supply of any factor of production (such 
as lumber), increases in the demand for construction would increase the equilibrium price 
of structures. Poterba defined supply as the net investment in structures32 and modeled the 
net investment in structures as a function of real house prices, the price of the output 
alternative (in this case measured by the nonresidential construction deflator), construction 
costs measured by real construction wages, and net deposit inflows into savings and loan 
                                                 
32 Although acknowledging the importance of land, he ignored land because of data issues for his empirical 
work. 
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institutions as a measure of credit availability. The results indicated that the price of 
housing was the major determinant of new construction and the elasticities of new 
construction with respect to real house price ranged from 0.5 to 2.3. The increase in the 
price of nonresidential construction decreased investment in residential structures and an 
increase in deposits to S&Ls (Savings and Loans) increased residential investment. Real 
construction wage generally had the wrong sign and was not statistically significant.33
 
Topel and Rosen (1988) examined the extent to which housing investment decisions were 
determined by comparing current asset prices with current marginal costs of production.  
They argued that if changes in the level of construction activity impacted the cost of 
production, then supply was less elastic in the short run than the long run. This divergence 
between short-term and long-term elasticities indicated that current asset prices were not 
sufficient and builders must form expectations about future prices in order to make 
investment decisions. In estimating the supply function where quarterly single-family 
housing starts were a function of real house prices and a vector of cost shifters, a basic 
myopic model and a model with expectations and internal adjustment costs were used. 
According to the results, the myopic model is rejected. They estimated a long-run supply 
elasticity of about 3.0 and a short-run elasticity of around 1.0. However, their results also 
indicated convergence between the two within a year. They argued that this rapid 
convergence was due to the fact that resources in the construction industry were not all that 
specialized and could be quickly assembled under changing market conditions. 
 
                                                 
33 Much of the empirical work on housing supply share the problem of poor performance of various measures 
of construction cost. 
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DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994) estimated a stock adjustment model that incorporated a 
simple model of urban form. In their model, price levels and cost shifters determined the 
long-run equilibrium stock. Housing price levels generated new construction only if those 
prices dictated a level of the stock that was higher than the current level. Using 1963–1990 
data, the single-family housing starts were estimated as a function of current housing 
prices, real short-term interest rates as a measure of the cost of capital to builders, land 
costs as measured by the price of agricultural land, construction costs measured as a 
weighted average of labor and material costs, and the stock of housing in the previous 
period. Their estimates of the price elasticity of the desired stock ranged from 1.2 to 1.4 
while estimates of the price elasticity of construction ranged from 1.0 to 1.2. According to 
their specification, it suggested that the stock of housing adjusts very slowly to shocks: 2% 
of the gap between actual and desired stock was closed in any one year. This rate yielded 
an adjustment period of 35 years, which seemed too long especially for single family 
housing, which can be constructed relatively quickly.  Besides, no significant relationship 
between construction costs and the level of construction were found, like Poterba(1984) 
and Topel and Rosen (1988). 
 
Mayer and Somerville (2000a) developed an empirical model of new single-family 
housing supply that reflected the role of land in producing new housing and the theoretical 
treatments of urban growth34. They treated housing starts as a function of changes in 
current and lagged house prices and costs rather than as a function of the levels of those 
variables, which previous studies have used. Empirical tests in their study supported this 
specification over the previous alternative models. This study found a stock elasticity of 
                                                 
34 Their model was based on the theory of urban land development presented in Capozza and Helsley (1989) 
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about 0.08 (i.e. a 10% increase in price yields a 0.8% increase in the total housing stock; a 
small number but a large magnititude, since in a given year the stock of housing is 50–100 
times starts), but a flow elasticity of about 6 (starts increase 60% from a 10% price 
increase). Besides, the significance of up to three lags of price changes and one lag of 
interest rate changes suggested that lags in the development process caused housing starts 
to take time to respond to demand shocks. The stock adjusted to a demand shock within 
one year, which was much faster than the 35 years in the model of DiPasquale and 
Wheaton and was similar to the year adjustment period in Topel and Rosen.   
 
The literatures that have been reviewed are mainly based on the U.S. housing market.   The 
studies of other countries (such as Whitehead (1974) for the UK and Malpezzi and Mayo’s 
(1994) for some developing countries) apply similar models with the U.S. literature.  
 
Among above literatures with structural approaches, the models based on urban spatial 
theory (DiPasquale & Wheaton, 1994; Mayer& Somerville, 2000) are theoretically 
superior to those based on the investment theory (Poterba, 1984; Topel & Rosen, 1988), 
since the former considered the role of land, which is a very important factor in the 
housing supply and should not be ignored .  
 
Between the two studies considering the role of land, the one by Mayer and Somerville 
(2000) seems have more advantages than the study by DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994).  
The model of DiPasquale and Wheaton incorporated a simple model of urban form and 
recognized the difference between the stock and flow of housing units, a condition ignored 
in some of the earlier empirical research. In their model, price levels generate new 
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construction only when those price levels dictate a long-run equilibrium stock that is 
different from the current stock. Hence, construction is a function of price levels and the 
lagged stock. However, the stock of housing is notoriously difficult to measure in non-
Census years35, which make the estimation difficult. Besides, physical depreciation and 
removals are also unobserved. However, Mayer and Somerville treated housing starts as a 
function of changes in current and lagged house prices and costs rather than as a function 
of the levels of those variables. Thus their approach has the significant advantage of not 
requiring a measure of the lagged stock in each period, compared with the model of 
DiPasquale and Wheaton. Moreover, their approach is more consistent with the time series 
characteristics of the data than the traditional levels specification, which is justified by the 
better out-of-sample forests36.  
 
3.3 Land Regulation and Price Elasticity of Housing Supply 
From the above examination, we can see that the empirical evidence on the price elasticity 
of housing supply is mixed. Muth (1960) and Follain (1979) provide evidence of high 
elastic housing supply. Other studies provide evidence of less than perfectly elastic supply. 
For example, Poterba (1984), Topel and Rosen (1988), DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994), 
Blackley (1999) and Malpezzi and Maclennan (2001) all estimate finite housing supply 
elasticities. Mayer and Somerville (2000a) find an even lower elasticity. What caused these 
significant differences in supply elasticity?  
 
                                                 
35 DiPasquale and Wheaton estimated from the decennial census. 
36 In the end, Mayer and Somerville provide out-of-sample forecasts using three different models and results 
indicated their model performed better than those in DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994) and Topel and Rosen 
(1988). 
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Based on the model developed by Mayer and Somerville (1999), Green, Malpezzi and 
Mayo (1999) first estimated separate elasticities for 44 individual metropolitan areas. Then 
estimated elasticities were used as dependent variables and the cross- metropolitan 
differences was explored by controlling for differences in urban form and in land use 
regulation, as well as other variables such as city size. They argued metropolitan 
differences in supply responsiveness existed in U.S. and the differences in supply 
elasticities stemmed mainly from differences in urban form and urban land use regulation. 
Their empirical results indicate the price elasticity of housing supply vary substantially 
from place to place. Metropolitan areas which are heavily regulated always exhibited low 
elasticities.  
 
The study of Malpezzi and Maclennan (2001), together with Malpezzi and Mayo (1997) 
also presented evidence that there are significant differences in supply elasticity across 
countries and that the differences seemed to be correlated with the stringency of the 
regulation frame work in place for land and housing development.  
 
Mayer and Somerville (2000b) presented a theoretical framework to describe the 
relationship between land use regulation and new residential construction. Building upon 
an earlier work (Mayer & Somerville,2000a), which modeled the new housing construction 
as a function of the changes in house prices and costs rather than as a function of the levels, 
they provided the estimates of housing supply at the MSA level37 using quarterly data on a 
panel of 44 metropolitan areas from 1985 to 1996. Assuming that the effects on new 
                                                 
37 Most empirical work on housing supply research uses national data, despite the absence of a national 
housing market. The national supply functions are subject to more of the aggregation bias described in 
Goodman (1998) than are studies using MSA data. 
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construction vary by the type of regulation, they characterized regulations as adding 
explicit costs, uncertainty or delays to the development process. The results indicated land 
use regulations had significant effects in lowering the steady-state level of new 
construction and reducing the responsiveness of local supply to price shocks (the estimated 
price elasticity): mean starts could be up to 45 percent lower in cities that had more 
extensive regulation; metro areas with greater regulation had price elasticities that were 
more than 20 percent lower than in cities with less regulation.  
Differences by type of regulation were also found: development or impact fees have 
relatively little impact on new construction, but regulations that lengthen the development 
process or otherwise constrain new development have larger and more significant effects.  
 
Recently, several studies based on the U.S. and the U.K. also indicated that land use 
regulations had significant effects in lowering the level of new construction and reducing 
the price elasticity of housing supply (Bramley, 1999& 2003; Glaser & Gyourko, 2003; 
Glaser, Gyourko & Saks, 2005). Examining the impact of different types of regulation on 
new construction and housing prices has become a new interesting study area. 
 
3.4 Summary  
In China, the existing literature on its housing market focused either on the descriptive 
analysis of the housing reform and the policies’ effects on the housing market or on the 
demand side of the housing market such as housing consumption and tenure choice in 
certain areas or periods. The empirical study on the supply side has not been done. Hence, 
the newer housing supply model based on urban spatial theory will be applied to the 
 47
housing market in China due to its theoretical superiority. Moreover, in China, land supply 
is more sensitive to government control and there are significant local variations in the 
land use regulations and other practices which probably influence the housing supply.  
Thus, the cross-city differences in supply elasticities will also be examined based on the 













Chapter 4 Estimating of New Housing Supply in China 
 
4.1 Introduction  
In order to understand the characteristics of housing supply in China, two empirical models 
are designed and tested in this study. The first is a cross-city model of new housing supply, 
which aims to explore the response of new housing supply to price changes.  In this model, 
new housing construction is described as a function of changes in house prices, changes in 
house costs and a series of variables that capture city-specific factors.  The second is a 
simple cross-sectional model in which the estimated supply elasticities of different cities 
are explained by a set of variables reflecting the stringency of land use regulations. The 
purpose of the second model is to explore the determinants of supply elasticities. This 
chapter presents the model design, the data, the variable selection and the empirical results 
of the first model. The second model will be presented in the next chapter.  
 
4.2 Model Specification 
Our first interest is to estimate the new housing supply and to learn the response of new 
housing supply to price changes. The methodology used in this estimation is mainly based 
on Mayer and Somerville’s model (2000), since their model is superior in two aspects 
among existing models, especially for the case of China. First, based on the theory of 
urban land development presented in Capozza and Helsley (1989), the Mayer and 
Somerville model considers the role of land in producing new housing and the theoretical 
treatments of urban growth. Considering the role of land development in housing supply is 
especially important in present-day China, which is experiencing significant urban growth.   
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The Mayer and Somerville model is better than the studies based on investment theory 
which neglects the role of land. Second, compared with other models that also incorporate 
urban form such as the stock adjustment model in DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994), the 
Mayer and Somerville model describes new housing construction as a function of changes 
in housing prices and costs. This specification is more consistent with urban growth theory. 
Because new construction, the dependent variable used in most empirical analyses of 
housing supply, is the change in the stock, housing starts should depend on the change in 
house prices, not on their levels. From an econometric perspective, this specification of 
housing supply avoids the econometric problems related to using a non-stationary 
explanatory variable (levels of housing price) in a time series equation with a stationary 
dependent variable38 . In addition, the Mayer and Somerville model does not require a 
measurement of the lagged stock in each period, which is often unavailable except in 
census years39. In China, the housing stock data is also unavailable for every year. Hence, 
based on the Mayer and Somerville model, a cross-city model is constructed to estimate 
the new housing supply in China. We will first describe the Mayer and Somerville model 
before explaining our cross-city model below. 
 
4.2.1 The Mayer and Somerville Model  
Mayer and Somerville (2000a) presented a model of new housing supply that is 
consistent with the theoretical treatment of land development and urban growth. Their 
                                                 
38 Research by Holland (1991) and numerous other researchers finds that the real price of existing housing is 
not stationary in levels (I (0)), but is instead stationary in differences (I (1)). The stock of housing is also non-
stationary in levels. Starts are the first differences in the stock, net of demolitions. With U.S. regional and 
national data, Mayer and Somerville (1996, 2000) find that the stock is non-stationary and starts are 
stationary in levels. 
39 DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994) estimated the stock from the decennial census in their study. 
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model described new housing construction as a function of changes in housing prices and 
costs. According to the monocentric models of urban growth (Arnott and Lewis, 1979; 
Wheaton, 1982; Capozza & Helsey, 1989), in a monocentric city, a positive demand 
shock generates a permanent increase in land and house prices at all interior locations of 
the city. The growth in population is accommodated by an expansion of the urban area 
since all new construction occurs at the fringe40. With stable construction costs, growth 
rates, and capital costs, house prices at the fringe are unchanged though the fringe itself is 
increasingly distant from CBD.  
 
Builders convert raw land to urban use by developing the land and constructing housing 
on the finished lots. With fixed lot and house sizes, developers maximize profits by 
selecting development time t* to convert land at location d, given agriculture land rent ra , 
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Without uncertainty, the solution to the above problem is the optimal development time, 
 
hah icrtdr +=),( *                                                                                           Equation 4.2 
When the price of housing at a currently undeveloped location exceeds the agriculture 
value and the cost of conversion, conversion occurs. At the fringe, location rents equal zero 
                                                 
40 In reality, some construction occurs at in-fill sites or as the redevelopment of existing units, but the bulk of 
this construction does occur in suburban areas. 
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since leaving land in its existing agricultural use or developing it must make no difference 
to land owners. However, in the city, all workers are assumed to work in the center and 
location rents reflect commuting costs to the urban core. Equilibrium house rent rh depend 
on the opportunity cost of land, which reflects lot size q and agricultural land rent r a; 
structure value which is the product of the capital cost i and the structure cost c h.; and 
location rents, which are a function of city size b41, transport cost k and distance d from the 
center of the city,  
)( dbkicqrr Thah −++= .                                                                                 Equation 4.3 
 
At time T and distance d from the city center, the price of a house is given by the present 
discounted value of house rents,  
dtedbkicrTdp TtithT a
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∞ −++= ∫ .                                                       Equation 4.4 
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 The first three terms are the present value of the components of current rent. The last 
term is the present value of the expected increase in rent at location d.  Instead of defining 
prices as a function of the distance from the border to the city center, the border is 








cTdpgib ahT +−−−=                                                                            Equation 4.6 
The city border is a function of the population, which, given a fixed ratio of population to 
land, determines the total stock of housing. When there is no undeveloped land in the city, 
the stock can be used to define city size. In a circular city of radius bT with θ radians of 
                                                 
41 The distance is from the core to the city border. 
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developed area and fixed lot size of l, the total stock HT  can be described by the city’s 








bbH =×=     .                                                                                      Equation 4.7                                    
Assume no abandonment or demolition. If all development occurs in a smooth process no 
leapfrogging, starts s* can be expressed as a function of the changes in price (and cost) 
levels from T-1 to T 
))1(),1,(())(),,(( −−−=∗ TcTdpFTcTdpFs hhT                                                  Equation 4.8 
 
In reality there are delays in developing land from non urban uses and then in constructing 
residential units on these lots. With these delays, developers must forecast demand several 
periods in advance of their expected completion dates. The number of finished lots, ld, in 
any period is a function of forecasts of city growth made in earlier periods. The number of 
actual starts depends on the optimal unconstrained level given the demand for new housing 
starts, s*, and the supply of developed lots ld available at time t 
],min[ ttt ldss
∗=                                                                                                              Equation 4.9 
),,,()],(),(min[ 1111, −−−−
∗ ∆∆∆∆≈∆∆∆∆= ttttttttttt cpcpgcpldcpss                        Equation 4.10 
 
where s is the housing starts, ∆  represents the difference of a certain variable, p is the 
housing price, c is the housing cost and the subscript t and t-1 indicate the time dimension.  
The housing starts are described as a function of changes in existing and lagged house 
prices and costs.  
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4.2.2 The Cross-city Model 
As pointed out in previous chapters, the housing market in China has a relatively short 
history. A national housing market did not develop until the early 1990s and the 
development in the first few years was very limited. Housing data such as housing 
construction and price are only available for at most 12 years42.  Moreover, these data are 
annual data. Estimating supply with only aggregate time series data seems infeasible in 
China. To overcome this problem, panel data at the city level is collected and used in this 
study instead of national time series data. Thus, based on the Mayer and Somerville model, 
new housing supply is described as a function of changes in house prices, costs and factors 
reflecting a city’s characteristics.  
 
                                                                                                                 Equation 4.11 
 
                                                                
where ,  and are vectors describing housing construction, price and cost 
respectively, ∆  means the difference of a certain variable; subscript t and t-1  indicate the 
time dimension;   while subscript i denotes the city where the data comes from;  is a 
matrix, capturing the characteristics of city i at time t , including city size, city pattern 
(population density), the level of economic development, city openness (FDI), land 
availability and a location dummy.  In China, the development of the housing market in 
each city is quite different. Cities with larger populations, more active market economies 
and higher openness levels tend to have more real estate development companies
tiS , tip , tic ,
tiX ,
43 and 
                                                 
, ,1,,1-ti,,, titititii ccpp −∆∆∆∆ ),,,(t XfS =
42 The housing reform has been extended to the whole country since 1992. So the data before 1992, although 
available, seems only to reflect the socialist institutional behavior instead of market behavior.  
43 For example, Shanghai has 2,199 real estate development companies in 2003 while Tianjin which has less 
population and lower output only has 761.  (In 2003, the GDP was 625 billion Yuan in Shanghai, 244.7 
billion in Tianjin). 
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more housing construction.  Additionally, land availability in a city may also influence 
housing construction. X, therefore, is added in the equation to control for the effect of city 
specifics on new housing supply.  
 
In this specification, the housing costs only include the construction material costs, which 
is different from the Mayer and Somerville model. The labor cost and financial cost, 
which are also important parts of housing costs, are not in this model for the following 
reasons.  
 
According to the literature for the US housing market, the effect of labor cost on housing 
construction is not significant. The main reason is that the construction industry demands 
low technological skill for labor. Thus the supply of labor resource is abundant. In this 
respect, for a developing country with a huge population, the labor cost is relatively low, 
with a negligible effect on construction cost. 
 
As for the financial cost, the nominal interest rate is under the control of the central bank 
in China and is basically the same across cities; other factors such as the property tax rate 
are also controlled by the central government.  Due to the lack of necessary data, it is hard 
to measure the true financial cost across cities. As a result, the financial cost is omitted in 
this model.  
 
4.3 Data Collection and Variable Selection 
To perform empirical tests of the above model, housing data such as construction activity, 
housing prices and construction costs for each metropolitan housing market are necessary.  
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 Macro-economic indicators at the city level and data about the urban size, urban form, 
urban growth and location for each city are also needed. However, there is no standard 
database of housing markets at the city level in China.  Instead, a city-level dataset is 
collected from various published statistical materials. This dataset contains annual 
observations from 1995-2003 on 50 city-area housing markets44. The housing data is 
mainly about commodity houses 45  developed by REDCs (Real Estate Development 
Companies). The city areas and time period are chosen according to data collection 
constraints. 
 
4.3.1 Data Scope 
Nine Years (1995-2003) 
As described in chapter two, the housing market has been established all over the country 
since the early 1990s. Thus, the data from 1995-2003 can reflect market behavior of the 
supply side. However, this period experienced an economic recession caused by the 1997 
Asian Financial Crisis, which may, to some extent, cause ambiguous empirical results.  On 
the one hand, when housing demand falls, the market cannot decrease the housing stock 
downward since housing is durable. On the other hand, when housing demand increases, 
housing supply can rise greatly if there is no constraints on land supply. The housing 
supply is asymmetric in the short-medium run: markets are more responsive in one 
                                                 
44 50 cities and 9 years are the most we can collect from published statistical materials.  
 
45 Currently, the new housing supply in China is mainly through the construction of commodity houses. The 
commodity houses are developed and sold by REDCs for profit, so their construction and prices are largely, 
if not totally, determined by the market. Hence, choosing the commodity houses as research object is 
consistent with the purpose of this study. 
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direction than another. The speed of adjustment of the housing market to upward shifts in 
demand is faster than it is to downward shifts in demand, in the absence of land constraints 
(Green, Malpezzi & Mayo, 1999). When housing price keeps flat or decreases, housing 
supply may still increase in the short-medium run, which cause abnormal relationships 
when estimating housing supply. 
 
Fifty Cities 
In China, the definition of a city is different from the ‘urban agglomeration’ or 
‘metropolitan area’ in the U.S.46 . Cities are defined as ‘urban places’ that correspond to 
local administrative and jurisdictional entities47. According to this administrative definition, 
a ‘city’ usually includes a central city area (a core city) and adjacent counties or towns 
under its administration48. There are 4 autonomous cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and 
Chongqing), 22 provinces and 5 municipalities in Mainland China. They are all 
administrative regions which come directly under the administration of the central 
government. Each city, except the autonomous cities, is under the control of a province or 
a municipality. Generally, the statistical data is based on either the core city area excluding 
counties (towns) or the total city area including counties (towns). In this study, the data is  
collected based on the total city area49, which is more similar to the ‘urban agglomeration’ 
or ‘metropolitan area’50. 
                                                 
46  There are generally three definitions of an urban unit: an administratively defined ‘urban place’, a 
‘metropolitan area’ and an ‘urban agglomeration’ (see Henderson, 1997, for the details). 
47 There are three different administrative levels of Chinese cities: municipalities (province-level cities), 
prefecture- level cities and county-level cities. Each has the same status as the province, prefecture and 
county, respectively. 
48 Some cities do not have adjacent counties or towns, such as Shenzhen.  
49 The data based on the core city are also collected for comparison.  
50  Metropolitan areas are collections of contiguous urban places (Henderson, 1997). [An] urban 
agglomeration [is] defined as a central city and neighboring communities linked to it by continuous built-up 
 57
 Our dataset covered the 50 main cities in eastern (coastal), middle and western regions 
(Figure 4.1). The sampled cities were chosen based on the economic and population scale, 
which will determine the size of their housing markets. Besides the housing market size, 
the geographical location is also considered since we also interested the regional difference 
of housing markets. Therefore, we include the first two or first three largest cities 
(according to their population and GDP) of each province in our database as long as the 
housing data is available. However, cities in all 50 cities in Shanxi, Gansu, Qinhai and 
Tibet provinces/municipalities are not in the database since the housing data can not be 
accessed in such cities. 
 
Except those of Shanxi, Gansu, Qinhai and Tibet, all provincial capital cities, totaling 23 
cities, were included. That is because for each province, the capital city is its economic, 
cultural and political center, and generally has the highest GDP and largest population.  
Besides, all 4 autonomous cities are among 10 biggest cities of China and are naturally 
chosen. The other 23 cities are all the second or third biggest cities of each province.  
 
Thus statistical data of these 50 Chinese cities can reflect the main activities of the housing 
market in China. First, a large amount population was included in our dataset. In 2003, 
there were about 660 cities in China. Among these cities, 49 were big cities which have 
more than one million population and 78 were middle cities of between half to one million 
population. In our dataset, 42 big cities and 8 middle cities are included, which 
                                                                                                                                                    
areas or many commuters (Soo, 2002, p. 7).The distinction between an urban agglomeration and 
metropolitan area is less clear.  
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accommodated 28.09% of the urban population in China. Second, these 50 cities also had a 
great share in the national product and in the housing market (Table 4.1). They accounted 
for 55.45% of the national GDP. The new housing construction of these cities was 222 
billion square meters floor space, which is 65.75% of the total housing construction in the 
country. 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the geographic locations of the 50 cities. Table 4.2 lists the names and 
regions of the cities. Some selected statistics in year 2003 are also given: city population, 
city land area, per capita disposable income, average housing price, new housing 
construction and living space per capita. 
 
Table 4.1 Population, GDP and New Housing Construction for of Sampled Cities 
(2003) 
 
 City Population 
(10,000 persons) 
GDP(Billion Yuan) New Housing 
Construction (Floor 
space billion sq.m) 
50 cities 147.12 6501.96 222.09 
Country 523.76 11725.2 337.74 
Proportion 28.09 55.45 65.75 
 










Figure 4.1 Location of Sampled Cities 
 
 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 














































Beijing  1079.22 12484 13882.6 2080.75 4456 15 middle Autonomous 
cities 
Shanghai  1278.23 5299 14867 2139.99 4989 19 coastal Autonomous 
cities 






















Shenyang  488.4 3495 7961 494.3 2753.11 15 middle Capital of 
Liaoning 
province 
Dalian  274.78 2415 9191.35 469.19 2698.97 14 coastal City of 
Liaoning 
province 
Changchun  310.01 3603 7907 199.14 2178 15 middle Capital of 
Jilin 
province 
Ha Erbing 315.2 1660 7905.36 302.66 1921.77 14 middle Capital of 
Heilongjiang 
province 
Qiqi Haer 142.67 4310 5774.4 132.25 1154.65 19 middle City of 
Heilongjiang 
province 
Daqing 118 5107 11029.2 20.9 1532.12 23 middle City of 
Heilongjiang 
province 
Nanjing  498.76 4723 10196 336.24 2888.44 16 coastal Capital of 
Jiangsu 
province 
Wuxi  219.6 1623 11647.16 456.29 2006.45 18 coastal City of 
Jiangsu 
province 
Suzhou  216.87 1650 12361.45 709.15 2481 20 coastal City of 
Jiangsu 
province 
Yancheng 66.33 423 8059 127.47 1050.26 18 coastal City of 
Jiangsu 
province 
Zhenjiang  100.51 1082 9451 89.36 1560.52 17 coastal City of 
Jiangsu 
province 
Hangzhou  393.19 3068 12898 553.97 3938.57 17 coastal Capital of 
Zhejiang 
province 
Ningbo  206.91 2560 14277 529.8 2540.87 17 coastal City of 
Zhejiang 
province 
Wenzhou  134.65 1187 16035 316.47 2809.97 22 coastal City of 
Zhejiang 
province 
Shaoxing 63.86 362 13535 199.53 2261.94 21 coastal City of 
Zhejiang 
province 
Hefei  155.87 596 7785 260.39 1895.23 17 middle Capital of 
Anhui 
province 




Xiamen  141.76 1565 12915.12 219.64 3137.19 20 coastal City of 
Fujian 
province 
Putian 201.63 156.1 8948.08 24.6 1199.65 28 coastal City of 
Fujian 
province 
Zhangzhou 51.87 401 9053 79.47 1247.67 23 coastal City of 
Fujian 
province 
Nanchang  196.37 617 7793.15 103.72 2079.15 17 middle Capital of 
Jiangxi 
province 
Jinan  334.8 3257 11012.86 295.36 2306.89 19 middle Capital of 
Shandong 
province 
Qingdao  246.77 1349 10075 462.14 2285.38 15 coastal City of 
Shandong 
province 
Yantai  170.83 2722 9785.42 236.99 1600.05 15 coastal City of 
Shandong 
province 
Zhengzhou  282.94 1010 8346.25 277.62 1994.38 19 middle Capital of 
Henan 
province 
Kaifeng  78.34 362 6184.41 52.26 1026.59 18 middle City of 
Henan 
province 
Luoyang  145.7 544 8005 167.41 1119.17 21 middle City of 
Henan 
province 
Wuhan  781.19 8494 8524.56 600.24 2023.19 17 middle Capital of 
Hubei 
province 
Changsha  196.26 556 9932.52 369.58 1785.97 18 middle Capital of 
Hunan 
province 
Guangzhou  588.25 3719 15002.59 3161.93 3998.82 17 coastal Capital of 
Guangdong 
province 
Shenzheng 150.93 1953 25935.84 816.62 5879 21 coastal City of 
Guangdong 
province 
Zhuhai 82.02 1688 16602.12 123.8 2964.11 25 coastal City of 
Guangdong 
province 
Shantou  477.36 1956 9104.76 121.65 1889.08 19 coastal City of 
Guangdong 
province 
Huizhou 108.74 2672 12673.5 86.53 1836.39 25 coastal City of 
Guangdong 
province 
Nanning  145.77 1834 9162 179.22 2168.68 18 west Capital of 
Guangxi 
province 
Guilin  71 565 8246.18 94.43 1678.82 17 west City of 
Guangxi 
province 
Haikou  139.19 2305 8349.7 81.23 1989.59 20 coastal Capital of 
Hainan 
province 
Chongqing 1010.12 7152 8093.67 1231.75 1324 21 west Autonomous 
cities 
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Chengdu  452.57 2177 9641 897.96 1908.32 17 west Capital of 
Sichuan 
province 
Kunming  224.22 4033 7979.43 672.52 2165 15 west Capital of 
Yunnan 
province 
Xian 510.26 3547 7748.38 289.56 1921.33 15 west Capital of 
Shanxi 
province 









Source: Statistics Yearbooks of various cities 
 
*The regional division is consistent with Sylvie Démurger et al. (2002). 
 
 
4.3.2 Variable Selection  
Basically, three groups of data were collected: housing, macro economic indicators and 
city specifics. Here we only include the explanations of variables used in this study. For a 
complete description of all variables, please refer to appendix C. 
 
Housing Data 
 The housing data is mainly about commodity houses developed by REDCs (Real Estate 
Development Companies). For each city, the data mainly includes: 
 
New housing construction: The number of commodity houses completed in the whole city 
area in the reference year, measured in square meters floor space. Annual completion of 
commodity housing is a good measure for the annual new housing supply. 
 
Housing price: The average real selling price per square meter, measured in Chinese Yuan. 
(The price is deflated by the Consumer Price Index).   
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 Construction material costs: The construction material price index with 1994 as the base 
year. The index reflects the building cost of the housing.  
 
Living space per capita: The floor space each urban resident can use, which equals to total 
residential living space divided by the total number of residents. Multiplied by the city 
population, it can reflect the total residential living space, which is a good measure for 
housing stock. The government usually uses it to measure the living conditions of urban 
residents, which reflect the development of housing market.   
 
Macro Economic Indicators 
GDP: Gross Domestic Production of the whole city area including counties, measured in 
Chinese Yuan. 
Disposable income per capita: Disposable income of each urban resident, measured in 
Chinese Yuan. 
 
FDI:  Foreign Direct Investment of whole city area including counties, measured in US 
dollars. 
CPI: Urban Consumer Price Index in the city area, which reflects the trend and degree of 
changes in the prices of consumer goods and services purchased by urban households. 
 
City Specific Variables 
Population: Two kinds of population were collected, registered total population and 
registered non-agriculture population of the whole city area including the counties. 
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According to the household registration system51 in China, Chinese citizens are divided 
into rural (agriculture) and urban (non-agriculture) categories according to their place of 
residence and occupations. Usually, the agriculture population lives in rural areas and self-
built houses.  The non-agriculture population lives in urban areas and need to buy or rent 
houses from the housing market.  
 
Land area: The land area of whole city including counties, measured in square kilometers.  
 
Green land area per capita: The public green area each urban resident shares, measured in 
square kilometers. 
 
Population Density: The number of persons per kilometer in the whole city area including 
counties. It equals total population divided by land area.  
 
Education level: It is the percentage of people having more than 15 years schooling. It is 
computed as the ratio of people who hold the degree of junior college to those above six 
years old.  
 
Administration Level:  A dummy variable which value is 1 if the administration level of a 
city is province or vice province, otherwise it equals 0. There are three different 
                                                 
51 The household registration system was set up to serve the needs of the planned economy. By controlling 
household movement, the system has ensured the growth of population in large cities and towns. This system 
divides Chinese citizens into rural and urban categories according their place of residence and occupations. 
Urban and rural residents have greatly different access to education, health care, basic infrastructure, welfare 
benefits, housing, employment and communications media. Urban residents have higher salaried incomes 




administrative levels of Chinese cities: municipalities (province /vice province -level 
cities), prefecture- level cities and county-level cities, each having the same status as the 
province, prefecture and county, respectively. Usually, big cities have a higher 
administrative level and have a more important status in the administration system. Thus 
enjoy greater decision-making power and more preferential policies. For example, Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangzhou are all province /vice province-level cities.  
 
 
4.3.3 Data Resource 
The data were collected mainly from various published statistics yearbooks, including: 
  
Statistics Yearbooks of Various Cities (1995 to 2004): annual statistics publications, which 
cover comprehensive data about economic development, fixed capital investments 
(including real estate investment), development of main industries (including the real 
estate industry) and living status of urban residents (including the housing conditions) in 
the respective cities. 
 
China Statistics Yearbooks (1995-2004): annual statistics publications, which provide 




China City Statistics Yearbooks (1995-2004): annual statistics publications, which cover 
main economic indicators such as population, GDP and the FDI of almost all Chinese 
cities (more than 660 in 2003). However, data on housing markets are not given. 
 
China Real Estate Statistics Yearbooks (2000-2004): annual statistics publications, which 
record the investment, construction and sales of every real estate sector in each province 
and 35 main cities. In addition, the real estate market of some big cities is further analyzed.  
 
China Population Statistic Yearbooks (2000): Provides tabulations on the 2000 population 
census of the People's Republic of China, including the characteristics of households and 
housing conditions in 2000.
 
Besides, some information was also collected from surveys and reports by the government 
and research institutions, which is available on their official websites. 
 
www.realestate.gov.cn, by the Construction Ministry in China  
www.realestate.cei.gov.cn, by the National Information Center  
www.estate-china.com, by China Real Estate Society 
www.industry.soufun.com, by Sofun Research Institution 
www.cpirc.org.cn, by the China Population and Development Center 




4.4 Variable Definitions and Statistical Description 
 
Table 4.3 gives the definitions for all the variables used in this empirical work. The annual 
completions of commodity houses, instead of annual starts, are used to measure the new 
housing supply since the starts data are unavailable. Annual commodity housing 
completions, which reflect the actual increase in housing supply in China’s metropolitan 
housing markets, could be good proxies for housing starts since the low rise residential 
buildings, which were the main housing form in the early years, generally can be 
constructed in one year52. Even the construction period is more than one year, the housing 
completion should also reflect, at least partly, the “current” economic situation because 
that the developers’ decisions of new housing developments depend more on the 
expectation of future economic and market situations than those of  current days.  
 
However, considering that more and more high rise residential buildings were constructed 
in recent years, two supplementary estimations besides the one presented in section 4.5 are 
conducted. Both of those tests are based on the same model presented in this chapter. 
However, different time lag factors are taken into account in these two additional tests. The 
first one use one year lagged housing completions as the proxy of housing starts, based on 
the assumption that the housing can be completed within two years; and the other one takes 
two year lagged housing completions as the proxy of housing starts,  based on a three-year 
construction period assumption.  
 
                                                 
52  This statement is based on the advice of more than ten architectures and project managers. However, the 
author understands more survey should be done in the future to support this statement. 
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The empirical results are basically consistent with the estimation in section 4.5 (Table 4.5). 
Thus, we would not present the results in this chapter. A complete presentation of those 
two empirical results and related analysis can be found in Appendix E.  
 
 
House price movements are measured by changes in the average selling prices of new 
commodity houses because a repeat sales price index, which is more consistent with the 
theoretical model, has not been established in China. The average house prices are deflated 
with the urban CPI (Consumer Price Index), and used to calculate the real house price 
changes. The construction material price index is used to capture the cost of material inputs 
to builders.  
 
The model in equation 4.11 also requires lagged price and cost changes. One-year lagged 
housing price and cost changes are included based on the four-quarter response period 
found in the literature (Mayer and Somerville, 2000a). 
 
Seven variables - population, density, real disposable income per capita, real GDP, FDI, 
green land area per capita and a location dummy- are used to capture the city 
characteristics. The non-agriculture population in the whole city area (including counties) 
is used to measure the city size. The population density, which tends to reflect the city 
form, is calculated as total population divided by the total land area of a city. The 
economic development of a city is characterized by two variables: real GDP and real 
disposable income per capita.  The FDI received by a city is a measurement of the 
openness level of a city and the green land area per capita tends to reflect the land 
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availability. The location dummy variable called middle, which equals to 1 if a city is in 
the middle region, is used to measure geographical fixed effects.  
 
Table 4.3 Variable Definitions 
 
Variable  Definition 
lnC Floor space of commodity houses completed  in the reference period  
lnPG Percent changes of real housing prices compared with the previous year 
laglnPG One-year lagged real price changes  
lnMC Percent changes of material price  
lagLnMC One year lagged material price changes  
lnPOP Non-agriculture population of whole city area 
lnD Population density of whole city area 
lnI Real disposable income per capita 
lnGDP Real Gross Domestic Production of whole city 
lnFDI Foreign Direct Investment in the u.s. dollars 
GA Green land area per capita of each city 
Middle Dummy variable, equals 1 if a city locates in the middle region  
 Note: All variables except ‘middle’ are measured in the natural logarithm. 
 
Table 4.4 gives some descriptive statistics for the variables used in this empirical work.  
After taking first differences and considering the lagged terms of house prices and costs, 
the final sample includes 310 observations. However, the sample of green land area per 
capita is smaller since the data is not available for some cities.  
 
Table 4.4 Simple Sample Statistics 
 







LnC 5.03 5.10 7.67 2.19 1.00 310 
lnGP 0.05 0.05 0.54 -0.46 0.11 310 
lnMC -0.01 -0.01 0.15 -0.17 0.04 310 
LnD 6.14 6.27 7.66 4.74 0.62 310 
LnPop 5.15 5.21 6.95 3.17 0.76 310 
LnI 8.69 8.66 9.93 7.89 0.33 310 
LnGDP 6.27 6.32 8.41 4.06 0.78 310 
LnGA 1.82 1.83 2.71 0.88 0.33 265 





4.5 Empirical Results 
 
The specification in equation 4.11 describes a supply function for new housing that is 
consistent with the urban development process. Although this model is appropriate for a 
single city, a strong assumption needs to be imposed before applying it to the metropolitan 
housing markets in China. That is, we assume that the same urban form framework is 
applicable to the cities in China.   
 
Five pooled regressions with different specifications about city characteristics (shown in 
Table 4.5), were carried out to explore the determinants of new housing supply based on 
equation 4.11. These regressions all include the current and lagged changes in housing 
price and construction cost. Seven variables are included in different combinations to 
control the city specifics.  
z In regression 1, only the effects of city population size, city density, city openness 
level and city location are included;  
z The land availability (green land area per capita) is added to those alone in regression 
3;  
z Instead of land availability , regression 2 and regression 4 both consider the effect of 
economic development, although with different variables-- the real income per capita 
in regression 2 and the real GDP in regression 4; 
z As with estimation 4, regression 5 included real GDP, but also considered the land 
availability.   
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Considering the possible endogeneity between construction and both current and lagged 
house prices and construction costs, lagged housing price and cost changes are used as 
instrumental variables  (IV )53. However, the instrumental variables estimations did not 
make any improvement54. Thus, Table 4.5 only presents the estimated coefficients of the 
five pooled regressions.  
 
Except for the population density, all the other variables measuring city characteristics 
have quite a consistent effect on new housing supply in all five estimations. Population, 
income per capita, GDP, FDI, green area per capita and the location dummy all have the 
expected effect on housing construction, and these effects are all statistically significant at 
the 1% confidence level. 
 
The economic development of a city tends to have the strongest positive effect on housing 
construction. Holding other variables fixed, when the disposable income per capita 
increases by 1%, new construction increases by 0.98% in regression 2; when the real GDP 
increases by 1%, as shown in regressions 4 and 5, construction increases by at least 0.69%.  
The FDI a city received, the population and the green land area per capita also have 
positive effects on housing construction. If a city receives 1% more FDI, construction 
increases by 0.23-0.5 %. A 1% growth in population results in as high as a 0.29% increase 
                                                 
53 One-year lagged price changes and cost changes are used as the instrumental variables of current price and 
cost changes, while two-year lagged price and cost changes as the instrumental variables for one year lagged 
price and cost changes. 
54 It may because the IVs chosen in this estimation is not appropriate. The possible appropriate instruments 
include lagged changes in construction costs and current and lagged changes in the number of married 
couples, the user cost of capital, nonconstruction employment, and real energy prices, as well as current and 
lagged exogenous variables, according to the previous empirical studies, such as Topel and Rosen (1988), 




in construction (as shown in regression 3). If each urban resident shares one more percent 
green land area, the city will see at least a 0.27% (regression 5) increase in construction.  
 
 
Table 4.5 Regression Results (New Housing Supply) 
Specification Regr.(1) Regr.(2) Regr.(3) Regr.(4) Regr.(5) 
Pooled regression      
lnPG -0.15 -0.16 -0.27 0.09 0.06 
 (0.34) (0.32) (0.36) (0.30) (0.33) 
lagLnPG 0.27 -0.01 0.09 0.10 -0.02 
 (0.27) (0.25) (0.27) (0.23) (0.24) 
lnMC -0.32 -1.36 -1.06 -1.66** -2.11** 
 (0.89) (0.87) (1.01) (0.80) (0.90) 
laglnMC -2.35 -1.75** -2.28** -2.13*** -2.18*** 
 (0.89) (0.84) (1.04) (0.73) (0.81) 
LnPOP 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.29*** 0.14*** 0.19*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
LnD 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.06 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
LnI  0.98***    
  (0.12)    
lnGDP    0.74*** 0.69*** 
    (0.08) (0.08) 
lnFDI  0.44*** 0.36*** 0.50*** 0.23*** 0.27*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
lnGA   0.39***  0.27*** 
   (0.11)  (0.09) 
Middle -0.53*** -0.70*** -0.75*** -0.54*** -0.68*** 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08) 
constant -0.01 -8.20*** -0.60** -2.09*** -2.45*** 
 (0.47) (1.02) (0.48) (0.39) (0.40) 
      
R-squared 0.58 0.65 0.64 0.73 0.76 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.57 0.64 0.63 0.72 0.75 
No. of 
observations 
310 310 265 310 265 
 
         Standard errors in parentheses 
         * significant at the 10% confidence level 
         ** significant at the 5% confidence level 
         *** significant at the 1% confidence level 
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The city location has a strong negative influence on housing construction. Cities located in 
the central area have at least approximately 53 % less construction than cities in the coastal 
or western regions. However, the coefficients on population density are not significant in 
the all estimations. It maybe because density is calculated as the population divided by 
land area, and these two variables have been largely reflected by the city size (population) 
and the land availability (green land per capita). Removing the density variable from the 
basic equation has little effect on other coefficients (however, the regression is not shown 
in the table 4.5). 
 
Although the variables measuring city specifics perform well, the performance of current 
and lagged housing prices changes and costs changes is not quite consistent with our 
original expectations. The current and lagged changes of housing costs have negative 
effects on the housing construction, as expected, but the effects are insignificant in some 
regressions. (Current cost changes have insignificant coefficients in regressions 1, 2 and 3 
while lagged cost changes have insignificant coefficients in regression 1). It is not a very 
surprising result since in many other empirical housing supply studies, the coefficients on 
the construction material prices were all not statistically different from zero. However, the 
coefficients of costs in regressions 4 and 5 are statistically significant at the 5 % 
significance level. 
 
Moreover, the effects of current and lagged house price changes on housing construction 
are inconsistent among these five estimations (for example, the coefficients of current price 
changes are positive in regressions 4 and 5 but negative in others); and these effects are not 
statistically different from zero. This result is not quite consistent with Mayer and 
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Somerville’s empirical work (2000a), in which price changes have a strong positive 
relationship with housing construction. Two main possible reasons for the unexpected 
results are discussed below: one is the quality of the collected housing price data and the 
other is the transitional characteristics of the housing market in China.  
 
A quality controlled housing price index is not available in China. Average selling prices 
may fail to capture the true housing price movements because these prices usually “do not 
control for the differences of housing services, across markets or over time” (Green & 
Malpezzi, 2003). Thus, the changes in house prices are caused not only by the fluctuations 
of the housing market, but also by the continued improvements in housing quality. Since 
quality improvements are not equal in each year, the true movements of housing prices 
cannot be determined. Thus, the changes in current and lagged housing price may not have 
the expected relationships with housing construction.  
 
Another possible reason is that the housing supply in China is not very sensitive to price 
changes due to the characteristics of a transitional economy. As discussed in chapter two, 
the old welfare housing provision system was not completely abandoned until 1999. The 
work units still played an important role in housing investment and construction.  The 
construction and the investment of work units may not be market-oriented.  This would 
also influence the behavior of real estate developers since the investments and the 
constructions by work units are often in cooperation with the real estate developers. For 
example, due to the Asia financial crisis, the housing price decreased in many cities such 
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as Beijing and Shenzhen55 in 1998. However, at the same time, the state required all SOEs 
(State Owned Enterprises) to submit their undeveloped land or pay a land use fee for these 
idle sites. Thus, many SOEs were eager to develop their unused land parcels and 
constructing houses for their employees became a first choice. As they lacked enough 
capital, they usually provided land as a factor of investment to cooperate with the real 
estate developers. Since the land cost was very low, the real estate developers could make 
a profit even though housing prices were not high. As a result, housing construction 
activities kept increasing although the price was falling56.  This institutional feature that 
linked employment and housing provision may result in an ambiguous relationship 
between housing supply and housing price.  
 
Besides these two main reasons, the problems of using housing completions as proxies for 
housing starts may also be a reason for the insignificant relationship between housing price 
and supply. Although the housing completions can reflect, at least partly, the market 
conditions at the time when the projects is finished, the delays, uncertainties and barriers in 
the development process may affect the completion time. That will weaken the relationship 
between the housing completions and current and lagged housing price changes.  
 
Moreover, endogeneity may also be a reason for the insignificant relationship between 
housing construction and price changes. Since changes in housing supply can also 
influence the housing price, the endogeneity may exist between housing construction and 
                                                 
55 In Beijing, the average selling price decreased from 5357 Yuan in 1997 to 5022 Yuan in 1998. In 
Shenzhen, the average selling price was 5470 Yuan in 1997 and decreased to 5190.48 Yuan in 1998.  
56 In 1998, 588. 7 million square meters of housing was constructed in Beijing, which increased by 20% over 
than the previous year. In Shenzhen, the increase is even bigger, reaching about 40 %.   
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price changes, which may make the estimations biased and inconsistent. Although our 
instrumental variables estimations did not improve the results, it is probably because the 
instrument variables used are not good enough. Thus, the possible endogeneity problem 
between the supply and the construction cost changes maybe a reason for the unstable 
performance of housing cost changes.57  
 
In summary, due to the problems analyzed above, the coefficients of housing prices 
changes are not consistent with existing empirical studies. The current changes in 
construction cost do not exert the same effect on new housing supply: in regression 4 and 5, 
it has significant negative effects on housing construction; in the others, negative but 
insignificant.  
 
The results suggest that housing construction is insensitive to housing price changes. 
However, Income, GDP and population all have strong positive effects on new housing 
supply. This is probably because these factors usually boost housing demand,58 and these 
strong positive effects are demand shocks that are not captured by the housing prices.  
Another possible reason is that economic and demographic growths also boost supply 
directly in a transitional economy as the government, which is a major housing provider 
directly or indirectly, both feel the need and is more affordable to provide more housing59. 
The relationships between housing supply and the above variables indicate that on the one 
hand, the market mechanism has already played an important role in the housing market in 
                                                 
57 Similarly, lagged construction material cost changes are used as the instrument variables. However, the 
instruments seemed don’t work too.  
 
58 Many studies (for example, Mankiw & Weil, 1989; Peeks & Wilcos,1991; and Green & Hendershott ,1996) 
implicitly or explicitly indicate that demographics and incomes drive demand for housing.    
59 According to the comments of an anonymous reviewers. 
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China, and on the other hand, this role is limited. The housing market in China has several 
transitional characteristics, as discussed in chapter 2. Besides, the significant effect of the 
city location on housing construction provides evidences on the regional disparity in 
China’s housing market. The cities in the middle region of China generally have less new 
housing supply. This is the first implication of this test.  
 
Another implication of this study is the need for establishing a standard housing database 
including quality controlled housing price indexes, both on a national and city level. The 
lack of data does not allow time series tests for estimating the housing supply. Therefore, it 
further indicates that presently, without the establishment of good housing database, the 
new housing supply cannot be well estimated in China. 
  
4.6 Summary  
This chapter presented an empirical estimation of new housing supply in China. The model 
design, data collection and variable selection and definition are described, and then the 
empirical results are given and discussed. Housing construction is estimated as a function 
of current and lagged house price changes, current and lagged construction cost changes 
and a series of variables capturing the city characteristics. The estimated results are not 
quite consistent with the existing literature: city characteristics--Income, GDP, Population, 
FDI and Location-- all have the expected effects on new housing supply while housing 
construction is insensitive to housing price changes. However, the insignificance of 
housing price changes is probably caused by the quality of the collected housing price data 
and the transitional characteristics of the housing market in China. The results also indicate 
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that there exists regional disparity in housing supply in China. In the next chapter, the 
source of cross-city variance in supply side responses will be investigated.   
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This chapter focuses on exploring the sources of cross-city differences in supply 
elasticities. A simple cross-sectional model is presented, in which the estimated supply 
elasticities of different cities are explained by a set of variables reflecting the stringency of 
land use regulations. The data used in the empirical tests are all from the self-collected 
dataset, described in the last chapter. We first describe the model specification, followed 
by the variable definitions and description, and finally the empirical results.   
 
5.2 Model Specification 
This test is to investigate the differences in supply elasticity across cities. As demonstrated 
by previous studies (Malpezzi & Maclennan, 1996; Malpezzi & Mayo, 1997; Green, 
Malpezzi & Mayo, 1999), there are significant differences in the price elasticities of supply 
across countries and metropolitan areas. These differences are, at least, partly caused by 
the different stringency of the regulations for land and housing development. Such 
differences in supply elasticities potentially exist across Chinese cities, since China has 
significant local variations in land use and other regulation practices.  We posit that the 
variation in supply elasticity due to different material costs will not be large across cities 
because materials are supplied nationally. Similarly, the variation in the supply elasticities 
due to labor market conditions is unlikely to be significant. Our prior is that the differences 
in supply elasticities will stem mainly from the differences in urban land use regulations. 
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 Till now, Green, Malpezzi and Mayo (1999) is the only study that directly explains the 
sources of differences in housing supply elasticities across the U.S. Metropolitan Statistic 
Areas (MSAs). They first estimated supply elasticities for 44 cities using time series data. 
In the second stage of analysis, the estimated elasticities were used as dependent variables 
and the variation in elasticities was explained by a series of variables including a dummy 
variable representing the stringency of the regulatory environment (Appendix D gives a 
detailed description of their model).  However, this model does not suitable for China 
because of the data limitation. Based on this idea, a straightforward way was taken to test 
the relationship between the supply elasticities and the land use regulations: a simple cross-
sectional regression was performed, in which the estimated elasticities of different cities 
are the dependent variables and a set of possible determinants, the independent variables. 
  
First, we estimate the separate supply elasticities for individual city areas. Unfortunately, at 
the city level, only 9 years’ annual housing data is available, it is impossible for us to 
estimate each city’s price elasticity of housing supply with the model of Green, Malpezzi 
and Mayo. And owing to the lack of time series data, it is also hard to use any existing 
model to evaluate the separate elasticities for each city. Therefore, the price elasticities of 
housing supply are calculated as the percent change in housing supply divided by the 

















=                                                                                              Equation 5.1 
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where Ei means the price elasticities of housing supply in city i; S and P indicate the 
housing supply and price in city i; and subscript t1 and t2 describe two different years in 
which t1 is the base year.  
 
After estimating the housing supply elasticities for the different cities, we regress the 
estimated elasticities on variables that can measure the stringency of land use regulations 
in each city.  Since projects or surveys which can reflect the regulation environment of 
each city are unavailable, we cannot obtain the variables that can directly reflect the 
regulation level. However, according to the experience from the U.S. (Green, Malpezzi & 
Mayo, 1999; Evenson, 2003; Glaser, 2003), which has demonstrated that a city with larger 
initial population, higher density and faster growth rate tends to have more stringent 
control for land development, we use similar variables; initial population, initial population 
density and city growth during the subject period in the test as explanatory variables60.  
                                                 
60 Although the general regulatory framework of USA and China are different, the rules and purposes 
underlining the regulations are similar.  
The land use regulation is a legal administrative system that prescribes what type of use is permitted on any 
given parcel of land.  There is no single defining form of land use regulation. Instead we observe multiple 
government interventions in land and real estate markets. These include explicit laws and implicit policies, 
all implemented with a wide range of enforcement and intensity.  In USA and many other countries this 
primarily takes the form of “zoning”. Under this approach the territory is divided up into zones within each 
of which certain types of land use are permitted subject to certain parameters (for example, the building lines 
for housing). There are two type of “zoning”: one focuses on the control of building related particulars such 
as plot ratio, building density, building height; another focuses on the control of city growth and spatial 
structure. According to the empirical study (Green, Malpezzi & Mayo, 1999; Evenson, 2003; Glaser, 2003), a 
city with higher initial population, higher density and faster growth rate tends to have more stringent control 
for land development. 
In China, land in the cities is owned by the State and granted land use rights on State owned land are almost 
the only marketable land interests. The usage of the land is etermined by the government before land use 
rights are granted or allocated. This usage determination, together with the issuance of land use rights, 
building permits and general regulation or land development are controlled by the administrative departments 
in charge of urban planning and real property development through two level of urban development planning: 
Master Planning and Detailed Planning (Ministry of Construction of China, 1990). The State establishes land 
use procedures and guidelines. However, the local government has the right to adopt guidelines effective 
within its area. The usage of the land is heavily controlled by the government via this land use control system. 
 
Before 2000, the central government in China tended to restrict the city development, especially the big cities. 
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 In addition, a dummy variable of city location is also included. The regional dimension is 
an indispensable part of China’s economic reform and property development. For a long 
time, China’s development has been concentrated in the coastal regions (see Figure 5.1 and 
Figure 2.5). Coastal cities are differentiated from non-coastal cities by not only their 
locations, which provide easy access to sea-oriented resources, but also by their pivot 
roles61 in socioeconomic and political interactions among nations (Han 1998).  While most 
private investment located in prosperous coastal regions, the interior central and western 
regions have seen relatively small changes over the years (Yu, 2004). According to the 
Blue Book of City Competitiveness (2005), cities with a more active market economy and 
more flexible policies tend to have more efficient government regulation. Therefore, in the 
coastal areas, the land regulation which delays the development process tends to be less 
stringent.  
 
Another reason for including a location dummy is because the western region generally has 
more unused land than other regions. As indicated in table 5.1, the share of developed area 
in total land area is much lower in the western region than in other regions. For example, in 
2003, only 5 % of the land was developed in Kunming, which is an important western city, 
while Shanghai, a coastal city, had 10 % developed area; Changsha, a big city in middle 
                                                                                                                                                    
The land use control system is the main measure to conduct such policies. Thus, it is expected that cities with 
larger population, higher density and faster growth rate tend to have more stringent control for land 
development. However, more investigation should be done in the future to justify the above assumption. 
 
61 In the late 1970s, four special economic zones (SEZs)—Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen—were set 
up to experiment with preferential development policies such as the relaxation of central government control 
and tax breaks for foreign and joint-venture firms. Then, during the 1980s, other coastal areas were granted 
special policies. The special policies had not been granted to non-coastal regions until the early 1990s (Sun, 
1996).  
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region has 22% developed area. Thus, the government control on land developments is less 
stringent.   
 
Besides, since the end of the 1990s, the state has put in a lot of effort to develop the 
western region. From 2000 to 2002, the state invested 600 billion Yuan in western cities 
and provinces. A series of preferential policies such as tax exemption and more decision 
making power62 was granted to the western cities. This gave strong economic and political 
incentives to the local governments in the western region to develop the housing market 
since the housing market has powerful spillover effects to the whole economy and 
economic growth is one of the main criteria to evaluate the performance of the local 
governments. Hence, land use regulation such as property development controls in the 
western area tends to be loose to facilitate the development. A dummy variable measuring 
the city’s geographical location is added in the regression to capture the regulatory effect. 
  
Table 5.1 Land Area and Developed Area of Selected Cities 
 
Region City Land Area 
(km2) 
Developed Land Area63 
(km2) 
Proportion (%) 
Coastal    
Shanghai 5299 550 10.40 
Shenzhen 1953 516 26.40 
Guangzhou 3719 608 16.30 
Middle    
Beijng 12484 1180 9.45 
Changsha 556 135 24.28 
Hefei 596 148 24.83 
West    
Chongqing 7152 445 6.22 
Kunming 4033 185 4.58 
                                                 
62 For example, presently, the governments of the western region can approve an investment project less than 
30 billion U.S. dollars while before 1999 such investments need to be approved by the central government. 
63 The developed land areas in a city are those parts in which buildings and basic municipal public facilities 
have been established. The land area and developed land area in this table are based on the core city 
excluding towns (counties).  
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Wulumuqi 7239 169 2.33 
 




The cross-sectional model is:  
 
),,,(ˆ iiiii LGDPopfE =                                                                             Equation 5.2 
 
where the subscript i indicates different cities; Eˆ  is the estimated price elasticity of 
housing supply; Pop is the population, which measures the city size; D means the 






Figure 5.1 GDP per capita (US Dollars) 
 
 





5.3 Proxies for Price Elasticities of Housing Supply  
In this test, we will focus on examining the long-run elasticities since the housing supply 
cannot adjust fully in the short run and supply elasticities tend to be very low (Evenson, 
2003).  Thus, a five year period (1998-2003) is chosen for analysis since the per capita 
living space, which is used to measure the housing stock, is not available for all cities 
before 1998.     
 
According to equation 5.1, two kinds of supply elasticities in this period were calculated. 
Table 5.2 and 5.3 give the definitions and statistical descriptions of all the variables used to 
calculate the elasticities. 
 
Table 5.2 Variable Definitions 
 
Variables Definition 
C Floor space of commodity houses annually completed  in the reference 
period, measured in 10,000 sq.m  
POP Population in whole city area, measured in 10,000 persons 
POPna Non-agriculture population in whole city area, measured in 10,000 persons 
P Real average housing selling price, deflated with CPI, measured in Yuan/ sq. 
m 
US Average living space per capita, measured in sq. m  
 
 
Table 5.3 Sample Statistics 
 







C 284.97 149.59 3204.06 1.58 433.65 400 
POP 579.29 553.29 3130.10 49.93 433.58 400 
POPna 228.63 176.42 1041.39 24.92 188.18 400 
P 1494.35 1286.14 4653.51 552.70 739.38 400 




The percentage change in housing price during the research period is calculated with the 
real average housing prices64.  The annual completions of commodity houses are summed 
together to measure the change in housing supply from 1998 to 2003. The initial housing 
supply is represented by two variables since the data on housing stock is unavailable at the 
city level. One variable is non-agriculture population in the total city area. The non-
agriculture population, which measures the number of people living in the core city and 
towns, is a good proxy for housing stock65, since people must buy or rent a house to live in 
if they want to live in a city66 (or a town). The other variable is the total residential living 
space, which comes from the product of per capita living space and population.   
 
With the variables above, two kinds of elasticities are obtained in the period 1998-2003, as 
shown in table 5.4, columns 1 and 2.  The elasticities in the first column are calculated 
with the housing stock measured as the product of living space per capita and population, 
while the elasticities in the second column directly use non-agriculture population to proxy 
the housing stock.  
 
From table 5.4, there are great differences across cities in these elasticities. For instance, 
Shenzhen and Wulumuqi have surprisingly high elasticities. Shenzhen, being a pilot city of 
economic reform, has one of the best developed housing markets. It is famous for its active 
private economy and efficient government. As for Wulumuqi, the capital of Xinjiang 
province which is in the western area, it has a large quantity of unused land (Table 5.1) and 
                                                 
64 This is the average housing selling price deflated by the urban CPI.  
65 Such a proxy may not represent the real elasticity well if living space per capita changed over years.   
66 People in rural area usually live in self-building houses. 
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has been facilitated in urban development by the state. Both cities are expected to have 
high supply elasticity.  
 
Table 5.4 Price Elasticities of Housing Supply for 50 cities 
 
City A (Total Living 
space as proxy of 
housing stock) 
B (Non-agriculture 
population as proxy of 
housing stock) 
Beijing -3.05 -45.29 
Shanghai 0.88 12.29 
Tianjin 5.75 72.28 
Shi Jiazhuang 2.68 39.62 
Tangshan 0.54 7.65 
Qing Huangdao 0.26 3.16 
Huhe Haote 1.53 19.22 
Shenyang 0.91 11.14 
Dalian 1.23 15.68 
Changchun 0.31 4.08 
Ha Erbing 1.33 17.02 
Qiqi Haer 0.24 2.57 
Daqing 0.91 14.32 
Nanjing 2.07 26.4 
Wuxi 0.55 8.07 
Suzhou 0.22 3.17 
Yancheng 5.69 48.41 
Zhenjiang 1.04 11.83 
Hangzhou 0.47 6.31 
Ningbo 0.45 6.61 
Wenzhou 0.09 2.32 
Shaoxing 0.2 3.36 
Hefei 0.48 5.66 
Fuzhou 0.4 7.26 
Xiamen 5.81 67.2 
Putian 0.04 0.74 
Zhangzhou 4.21 39.67 
Nanchang 0.13 1.46 
Jinan 0.22 3.39 
Qingdao 1.04 13.9 
Yantai 1.08 16.72 
Zhengzhou 0.38 4.82 
Kaifeng 0.18 2.11 
Luoyang 1.04 13.5 
Wuhan 0.97 11.85 
Changsha 1.36 16.94 
Guangzhou -37.49 -432.99 
Shenzheng 13.34 260.47 
Zhuhai 9.25 228.77 
Shantou 0.78 10.12 
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Huizhou 0.38 5.83 
Nanning 0.32 4.15 
Guilin 0.15 2.05 
Haikou 0.88 14.49 
Chong qing 0.73 8.86 
Chengdu 0.61 9.5 
Kunming 2.65 36.39 
Xian 0.54 6.02 
Yinchuan 1.4 17.84 
Wulu Muqi 4.7 58.7 
 
 
Beijing and Guangzhou stand out as having the lowest elasticities. These two cities 
experienced price decreases after the Asian Financial Crisis. However, as analyzed in the 
previous chapter, when the housing price is falling, housing supply may still increase in the 
short-medium run due to the asymmetric characteristic of housing market (section 4.3.1) 
and  the transitional characteristics of the housing market in China (section 4.5). Beijing 
and Guangzhou are excluded as outliers in the next stage analysis.   
 
5.4 Sources of Differences in Supply Elasticities 
 
After getting the estimated supply elasticities for 50 cities, two simple cross-sectional 
regressions based on equation 5.2 were performed to explore the source of differences in 
supply elasticities.  
 
The elasticities in table 5.4 are employed as dependant variables. All independent variables 
used in the regressions are defined in table 5.5. The population of a city in 1998 is used to 
measure the initial city size individually; the population growths during 1998-2003 is used 
to measure the city growth; and the initial city form is measured by population density, 
which is computed with total population divided by land area. All these variables come 
from the self –colleted dataset.  
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Table 5.5Variable Definition (Exploring Sources of Differences in Supply Elasticities) 
 
Variables Definition 
lnPOP Population in the initial year (1998) 
lnPOPG Population growth during the subject period(1998-2003) 
lnD Population density of whole city area (1998) 
middle Dummy variable, equals 1 if city locates in middle area 
Note: All variables except ‘middle’ are measured in the natural logarithm 
 
 
The variables were explained in natural logarithms67. First, the OLS (Ordinary Least 
Squares) regression with heterogeneity adjustment is employed. In addition, considering 
possible endogeneity between the supply elasticities and city growth68, the 2SLS (two-
Stages Least Squares) regression was also used, by introducing three variables--a lagged 
population growth, an education level measured by the percentage of people having more 
than 15 years schooling and a location dummy-- as instrumental variables for the 
population growth. However, the 2SLS approach failed to improve the estimation. Then 
we performed a test for endogeneity first suggested by Hausman (1978) and the results 
indicated that the city growth is exogenous.  Thus, the OLS results are presented in table 
5.6, since the 2SLS estimators are less efficient than those of the OLS when the 
explanatory variables are exogenous (Wooldridge, 2002). 
 
 
The estimations given in Columns A and B use the respective pseudo elasticities in table 
5.4. White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent standard errors69 are given in parentheses below 
                                                 
67 We also do a linear regression for comparison and the logarithmic specification gives us sharper parameter 
estimates based upon the t statistics, so we present the results of logarithmic form. 
68 The endogeneity may exist between the supply elasticities and city growth since “the elasticity of housing 
supply helps determine the extent to which increase in productivity will create bigger cities or just higher 
paid workers and more expensive homes” (Glaser,2003) . That means the housing supply elasticities may 
have a significant effect on city growth.  
69  Cross-section of data tents to be plagued by heterogeneity, so standard errors are corrected for 
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the estimated coefficients. The estimated coefficients in these regressions are quite 
consistent although they use different proxies for the housing stock. Except for the 
population density, the other variables all have expected negative effects on supply 
elasticities; and these effects are statistically different from zero. 
 
 
Table 5.6 Regression Results (Supply Elasticities) 
 
Regression type: Regr.(1) Regr.(2) 
 A B 
lnPOP -0.18*** -0.26** 
 (0.07) (0.1) 
lnPOPG -0.37** -0.44** 
 (0.17) (0.17) 
lnD 0.02 0.03 
 (0.05) (0.07) 
middle -0.08** -0.12* 
 (0.04) (0.06) 
constant 3.47*** 6.25*** 
 (0.31) (0.48) 








White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at the  10% confidence level 
** significant at the 5% confidence level 
*** significant at the 1% confidence level 
 
 
Population growth, which measures city growth, tends to have the strongest negative effect 
on supply elasticity: a 1% increase in a population growth causes about a 0.4% decrease in 
the five year elasticity. The initial city population also has a negative effect on supply 
elasticities. When the city population increases by 1%, the elasticity falls by at least 0.18%. 
                                                                                                                                                    
heterogeneity. 
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 The cities located in the middle region generally possess lower elasticities compared with 
those in the coastal and western regions. Five-year elasticities of middle area cities are 
around 10 % lower than those of the other cities. The different pattern of cities in the 
coastal area was also considered through including another dummy variable, coastal. 
However, the variable coastal does not affect the results and so was dropped from the final 
regression in order to preserve the degrees of freedom.  
 
However, we are not clear about the effects of population density since the estimated 
coefficients are statistically insignificant at the 10% level. One possible reason for this 
insignificance is the population density used in the regressions is the average density of the 
total city area70. Its shortcoming is that the total city area includes counties. Consider, for 
example, two cities with equal average densities. One may be a compact central city 
surrounded by a large rural area, while the other may be settled at a more uniform density. 
The former would be denser but average density would not differentiate between them. 
Hence, one of the possible improvements is to use a more “sensible” density, such as the 
one used in Malpezzi and Guo (1999). However, such an improvement will depend on the 
data availability. 
 
In summary, negative relationships between supply elasticities and city population, city 
growth and central region location are found. These relationships implicitly indicate that 
stringent land use regulations tend to lower the supply elasticities in China. Cities with 
large populations and fast growth rates tend to have more controls on land development 
                                                 
70  This density is calculated as total city population divided by total city area. 
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and housing construction. Besides, the coastal and western regions in China tend to have 
less stringent land use regulations. Compared with the central area, the costal region has 
more efficient governments, which will reduce the delays of the development process; and 
the western region has more unused land and preferential policies, which will encourage 
land development. Hence, our findings are consistent with the U.S. literature (Green, 
Malpezzi & Mayo, 1999; Bramley, 1999&2003; Mayer & Somerville, 2000b; Glaser & 
Gyourko 2003, Glaser, Gyourko & Saks 2005).   
 
5.4 Summary 
In this chapter, an empirical test which explores the source of cross-city differences in 
supply elasticities is performed and the results are analyzed. The supply elasticities for 50 
main Chinese cities are calculated and we then investigate the source of cross-city variance 
in supply-side responses. Using two measures of supply elasticities in the period 1998-
2003 for 50 main Chinese cities, we found that cities with larger initial size (larger 
population) and fast growth rate (population growth) tend to have lower price elasticities of 
housing supply. Cities located in the middle region have at least ten percent lower supply 
elasticities compared with cities of the coastal and western regions. This provides further 
evidence of the regional disparity in the housing market, which has been indicated in 
previous chapters. Generally, the results are consistent with the existence of a negative 




Chapter 6 Conclusions  
 
This study aims to provide an understanding of the housing market in China. First, we 
develop a framework for analyzing the housing market in China during the economy’s 
transition from a centrally-planed system to a market-oriented one. Then, an empirical 
estimation of new housing supply is performed, in which housing construction is estimated 
as a function of current and lagged house price changes, current and lagged construction 
cost changes and city-level characteristics. Finally, the sources of cross-city differences in 
supply elasticities are explored through a cross-sectional model. A city-level housing 
dataset for 50 cities was collected by the author to perform the two empirical tests. 
 
6.1 Main Findings 
The housing system in China has experienced great change from a state-dominated welfare 
system to a market-based model since the economic reforms started in 1978. By examining 
the development of the housing market, we find that current housing investment and 
construction are dominated by real estate developers. The source of home investment was 
diversified and was greatly extended. However, the old welfare housing system was not 
completed abandoned until the end of the 1990s, which resulted in housing supply and 
demand being insensitive to price changes in China. Besides, low affordability, low 
mobility and regional disparity are all observed in urban China’s housing market.     
 The results of the new housing supply estimation indicate that both the economic 
development level of a city (measured by per capita disposable income or GDP) and the 
city size (measured by population) have strong positive effects on new housing supply. 
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This is probably because these factors usually boost the housing demand and then further 
stimulate housing supply. Besides, the results also indicate that the cities in the middle 
region of China generally have less new housing supply, which provide further evidence 
on the regional disparity in China’s housing market. However, housing construction is 
insensitive to housing price changes. This may be because the housing price used in the 
estimation is the average selling price, which may not precisely measure the true price 
movements. Another possible reason is that the housing supply in China is not very 
sensitive to price changes due to the characteristics of the transitional economy. The link 
between employment and housing supply was not completely untied. The work units still 
played an important role in housing investment and construction. Housing construction and 
investment by work units were often not market-oriented. This would also influence the 
behavior of real estate developers since the investment and the construction of work units 
were often in cooperation with the real estate developers. In addition, another implication 
of this study is the need for establishing a standard housing database including quality 
controlled housing price indexes, both at the national and city levels. 
  
Furthermore, the supply elasticities for 50 main Chinese cities are calculated and then used 
to investigate the source of cross-city variance in supply side responses. The empirical 
results indicate negative relationships between supply elasticities and city population, city 
growth and the middle region location. These relationships implicitly indicate that 
stringent land use regulations tend to lower the supply elasticities since cities with larger 
populations and faster growth rates tend to have more controls on land development and 
housing construction. Besides, the coastal and western areas in China tend to have less 
stringent land use regulations. Compared with central area, the costal region has more 
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efficient governments, which will reduce the delays of in the development process; and the 
western region has more unused land and preferential policies, which will encourage land 
development. Hence, our findings are consistent with the U.S. literature. 
 
6.2 Policy Implications  
The findings have important implication for policy makers. Although housing production 
and consumption kept increasing since the end of the 1970s, the average living space per 
capita is relatively low compared with other countries71. China has experienced continued 
economic growth and urban population growth since the end of the 1970s. From 1979 to 
2004, the annual GDP growth is around 9% and the annual urban population growth is 
about 4.6% (State Statistics Bureau, 2005). This has driven the demand for housing and 
will also drive the demand in the future since urbanization is encouraged by the state. 
Facing such a strong demand drive, the response of the supply side is very important. As 
indicated by our empirical results, the stringent regulation on land and property 
development tends to lower the supply elasticity and limit new housing construction.  
Hence, it seems crucial for the government to lessening its controls, allow more free play 
from the market in order to increase the housing supply. This is especially true for cities in 
the middle region with the lowest supply elasticity, where government may need to operate 
more towards a market-oriented system in order to facilitate housing development.  
 
 
                                                 
71For example, in the U.S., average space per capita s about 700 square feet or 65 square meters, according to 
the 1989 American Housing Survey while average living space was only 13.4 square meters. 
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6.3 Limitations and Future Research 
This study has several limitations which are listed as follows: 
 
First, the estimation of new housing supply fails to give an exact price elasticity. This is 
mainly due to the data limitation and the transitional characteristics of the housing market 
in China. However, with increasing availability of higher quality housing data, the 
estimation is expected to improve. 
 
Second, the effect of the land use regulation on the supply elasticity has not been directly 
measured and the exact effect is not fully captured in this research. Such a situation can be 
improved through constructing an index of land use regulation. Surveys on land use 
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Appendix A Government Regulation of Property Development 
 
 
1) Planning guidelines  
 
According to China’s Urban Planning Act 1989, there are two levels of urban development 
planning: Master Planning (zongti guihua) and Detailed Planning (Xiangxi guihua) 
(Ministry of Construction 1990) 
 
The outcomes of these two planning phases are Master Plans and Detailed Plans 
respectively. A Master Plan is prepared for guiding the development of land use and 
location of major projects within the urban area for the next 20 years. Detailed Plans are 
made for immediate implementations, usually for the next five years or so, setting the 
development codes such as plot size, layout of facilities, density, building height, among 
others. In addition to these two main levels, each city can decide whether to include zoning 
plans (Fenqu guihua) (Ministry of Construction 1990, 47). The purpose of zoning plans is 
different from that in many western countries as it is not to designate land use and/or 
zoning ordinance. Rather, zoning plans as defined in China’s Urban Planning Act is to 
further detail the Master Plan so that there will be substantial guideline for making the 
detailed plans. 
 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that flexibility was built in the various plans in order to 
suit the interests of different parties. 
2) Development Control 
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 Clause 29 of the Urban Planning Act 1989 states that land utilization and all development 
within the planned area must conform to the plan and subject to planning management 
(Ministry of Construction 1990, 8). Comments on site selection from the urban planning 
department are a prerequisite for a developer to apply for an approval on the project design 
guidelines. Application for the latter is alternatively known as project registration. With the 
project properly registered, or the project design guideline approved, the urban planning 
authority will check on the site location and boundaries, provide guidelines for planning 
and design for the site, and check and issue the land use planning permit. Only with a 
proper land use planning permit, a developer could acquire and transfer land user right. For 
new construction, further extension, and redevelopment of buildings, structures, road, 
pipelines and other facilities, the developer has to acquire a project planning permit. This 
allows the urban planning authority to check and approve on the proposal before any 
construction could commence. Finally, urban planning authority participates in the 
inspection of complete project to ensure that planning and design guidelines are properly 
observed (Ministry of Construction 1990, 8-10). 
 





Document Government department 
Project registration Developer’s qualification 
certificate; 





Land use planning permit Report on site selection; 
Environment impact 
assessment; 
Design scheme  
Municipal Urban Planning 
Bureau 





Municipal Fire Department 
 
Project planning permit  Municipal Construction 
Commission 
Municipal Urban Planning 
Bureau 








Endorsement from all the 






Land user right and property 
ownership certificate 
Inspection report on 
completed project; 
As built drawings 
Municipal Urban Planning 
Bureau 




Municipal Fire Department 
Note: * In case of Chongqing 












Appendix B Behavioral Studies of Demand 
 
Several recent studies have investigated the demand for housing in China. These include 
studies of the tenure choice decision as well as traditional estimation of the demand for 
housing. 
 
Fu, Tse and Zhou (2000) showed that the intention to buy commodity housing by Chinese 
urban workers is sensitive to various incentives, namely, housing mismatch, liquidity 
constraints, risk attitudes, access to publicly subsidized housing and commodity housing 
prices. In particular, the individuals who are likely to participate in the housing market are 
those who have a relatively high income and live in a crowded home, are mobile in the job 
market and invest in stocks, are economically confident and young, and have no access to 
publicly subsidized housing. Their probit estimates indicate that the access to publicly 
subsidized housing is at least as important as the affordability of commodity housing in 
discouraging private home ownership. The data used in their study was collected in a 
large-scale survey in nine major Chinese cities of different levels of economic 
development in 1997. 
 
Two studies by Li (2000a, 2000b) in the same year also provided important findings on 
housing behavior in urban China. Li (2000a) conducted a comparative study of housing 
consumption in Beijing and Guangzhou, drawing upon two surveys of newly completed 
commodity housing conducted in 1996. He argued that the housing market is segmented 
and there are different forces governing tenure decisions in different housing sectors. 
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While tenure decisions for the open market housing are somewhat similar to those in 
Western housing markets, those for subsidized housing are quite different. Although some 
household characteristics such as the number of children and number of workers play a 
role, occupation is a much more critical factor in the decision process. Li (2000b) also 
argues that the traditional welfare-oriented housing system still imposes a significant 
influence on housing consumption in China, even in cities known for their openness and 
market orientation. The sample in this study was based on the list of presale commodity 
housing units issued by the Housing Bureau of Guangzhou (Guangzhou Shi Fangdichang 
Guanliju) over the period January 1992 to August 1994. Yet, the studies by Li have been 
limited to two cities (Guangzhou and Beijing) and to newly built ‘commodity housing’. 
While focusing on the segmentation of the housing market, Li fails to examine the 
institutional context of tenure decisions in China—the socialist transition towards a market 
economy—and how it affects households’ behavior.  
 
A later study by Huang and Clark (2002) extended the work by Li to assess both new and 
old housing and covered a national sample of households. This study examined the 
housing tenure choice in transitional urban China using a 1996 national survey of housing 
in China and a multilevel modeling technique. The results indicate both market 
mechanisms and institutional forces affect households’ tenure choice in urban China. 
While some socioeconomic factors such as age, household size, household income and 
housing price have similar effects on tenure choice as in the West, others such as the 
number of workers and marital status have rather different effects. In addition, factors 
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characterizing institutional relationships among the state, work units and households, such 
as Hukou72, job rank and work unit rank, still play important roles in tenure choice. 
 
A study about renter behavior by Huang (2003) drew a similar conclusion. Also using the 
national survey carried out in 1996 and the technique of multi-level modeling, Huang 
examined how renters make their housing decisions in urban China, where market 
mechanisms are being introduced into a previously welfare oriented housing system. It is 
indicated renters’ choices are constrained not only by socio-economic factors as is the case 
in the West, but also by persisting socialist institutions such as the Hukou system and work 
units. While private housing is becoming an important option, renters who can access 
public housing are still more likely to choose public housing because of heavy subsidies. 
Yet, renters with rural and temporary Hukou, and those working in low-ranking work units 
are at a disadvantage in the housing market. 
 
Another study by Michael and Kwong (2002) attempted to identify the major determinants, 
household demographics and work unit characteristics in tenure choice decisions. Their 
case study on Guangzhou provides insights into the decisions of the household in Mainland 
China on choosing the utility-maximizing tenure mode. The results indicate that the market 
                                                 
72 The household registration system in Chinese cities, developed in 1950s. It had been an important tool for 
government control (see Chen & Seldon (1994) for more details on the system). 
The hukou system, “an internal passport system” (Chan, 1994), divides the population into four groups based 
on birthplace (urban vs. rural) and registration status (permanent vs. temporary): a population with urban and 
permanent hukou, rural and permanent hukou, urban and temporary hukou, and rural and temporary hukou. A 
person’s hukou status determines his/her socioeconomic status and opportunities, e.g. employment 
opportunities and access to welfare benefits. For example, only those with permanent and urban hukou can 
access public housing. Although the hukou system is becoming less important in Chinese society (Wang, 
1997), it still play a role in the housing choice.  
 
 124
allocation mechanism introduced by the housing reforms has not yet replaced the 
entrenched influence from work units on home ownership behavior. 
 
Huang (2004) examined tenure composition in three cities: Beijing, Chongqing, and 
Jiangyin73. Although a large-scale tenure switch from public rental to various forms of 
ownership is evident in all three cities, substantial differences in tenure composition 
between cities are also revealed. More specifically, households in Beijing are more likely 
to reside in public housing, whereas those in Jiangyin are more likely to own. The case of 
Chongqing lies somewhere between Beijing and Jiangyin. Huang attributes these 
differences to: (1) housing stock composition: there was a dominance of private housing 
even in the early days of reform in Jiangyin, but public housing has always dominated the 
housing provision scene in Beijing and Chongqing; (2) local economy: Beijing and 
Jiangyin have experienced much faster growth than Chongqing; (3) the housing market in 
these three cities: the price of housing is much higher in Beijing than in the other two cities; 
and (4) local government behaviour, particularly regarding attitudes towards the 
implementation of national housing policies. In particular, Jiangyin has adopted much 
more aggressive reforms from the outset. 
 
Wang and Li (2004) studied the housing choice in Beijing, based on stated preference 
experiments conducted in 2001. Stated preference techniques are commonly employed in 
European countries in which market-clearance processes are severely distorted by state 
actions (Strassmann, 2001). In the case of China, this is perhaps the only approach to study 
                                                 
73 The first two are massive metropolises with populations exceeding 10 million. The third is a relatively small city 
with a population of only 150 000. 
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housing preference, given the embryonic state of market development. The subjects in the 
study are 1600 household heads selected according to a probability sample stratified 
according to the city's original eight urban districts. The results show: (1)The reputation of 
a district is of great significance in the choice of housing, especially among white-collar 
workers. This has obvious implications for the emerging patterns of spatial segregation in 
the city. (2) Neighbourhood security and living convenience are also important in housing 
decisions. The young and old age groups are particularly concerned with the former, 
whereas the middle and old age groups are concerned with the latter. (3) The choice is 
quite price elastic. (4) Although in general dwelling attributes appear to be of secondary 
importance, as compared with neighborhood attributes, the internal layout of a dwelling 
and dwelling orientation nevertheless prove to be significant factors influencing housing 
choice. 
 
The general suggestion from these tenure choice studies is that the tenure choice in urban 
China is constrained not only by household characteristics and the housing market, which 
is similar with western countries, but also by factors that characterize the institutional 
relationships among households, “work units” and the government. On the one hand, high 
housing prices discourage ownership and lead to a low rate of home-ownership at the city 
level, which is similar to findings in Western housing markets. On the other hand, a closer 
institutional relationship among these agents in general discourages households from 
choosing homeownership. In addition, the relationships between households and other 
agents in the housing system vary across cities, and thus tenure choice demonstrates 
intercity differences.  
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Furthermore, above studies, although published in different years, were almost based on 
the data in the 1990s, and their results were quite consistent with the characteristics of the 
housing market in the second stage. In the 1990s, urban households in China, who had few 
housing choices but to wait for subsidized rental housing (also ‘public housing’, gong fang) 
in the socialist era, had choices regarding both housing type and tenure. Sitting tenants of 
public housing were given the option of either paying an increased rent or buying their 
current flats at subsidized prices. All urban households could choose private housing such 
as ‘commodity housing’ and could choose between renting and owning. Thus, the Chinese 
household tended to respond like western households. However, in the same time, the link 
between housing provision and employment was not cut. The work units not only sold 
their existing stock to employees at a heavily subsidized price, but also continued their 
house-building program or purchased new housing from the market and distributed them to 
their employees at discounted prices. The institutional relationships among households, 
“work units” and the government also, inevitably, influenced the housing behavior.   
 
The traditional housing demand studies are summarized in table A.2. . In the literature of 
China, there are a few studies that estimated income elasticity of housing demand, but 
estimates about price elasticity are seldom found.  
 
Chen (1997) found the income elasticity of housing demand of around 1.2 with the 
nationwide housing expenditure data of different income groups from 1992 to 1995. Liu 
(2000) estimated a 1.16 income elasticity which is similar to Chen based on cross section 
data of 26 provinces and 4 autonomous cities. However, the housing price wasn’t included 
in the demand function. With time series data of urban residents’ consumption, Zang (2001) 
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constructed an ELES model and calculated income elasticities of different consumption 
goods, among which the income elasticity of housing demand was around 0.73.  
 
Table A.2 Summary of Selected Demand Studies in China 
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The first three estimations, however, are probably biased due to two reasons. First, the 
housing expenditure data in China was not reliable. Lack of the data in the household level, 
these estimations were all based on the macro level cross section or time series data- 
average housing expenditure of urban residents in different income groups or in different 
regions. The average housing expenditure, which was calculated with total housing 
expenditure divided by total households, tent to be underestimated since the total 
expenditure only included the housing rents, ignoring the capital cost of owners, while the 
total households included both renters and owners. Second, the price difference between 
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housing and other commodities was not considered. If the sample contained households of 
different income groups or in different time periods, the heterogeneity of the price 
difference between housing and other commodities must be considered.  However, the 
price is not in the model estimating income elasticity in above studies74.   
 
The forth study by Zheng (2004), to some extent, overcame above two problems by using 
the individual household data from a special investigation and including the price index of 
housing and other commodities in the demand model. Zheng got much lower income 
elasticities compared with his peers- 0.66 for owners and 0.5 for tenants. The price 
elasticity was also given in Zheng’s study. For owner-occupied household, the price 
elasticity was -0.49 and for tenant-occupied was -0.37. The relatively low income elasticity 
implied that the income growth is not strong enough to sustain the housing demand 
increase. Considering the strong housing demand in China, we can see there must be other 
factors responsible for the demand increase, which is consistent with the stylized facts in 
China.  
 
Although robust conclusion can not be obtained from the limited estimations of demand 
elasticity in China, we can find some similarity of the Chinese demand results to the U.S. 
results. First, the elasticities in Zheng’s study is lower others, which is consistent with the 
U.S.. In the U.S., early studies using aggregate data generally found income elasticities 
around 1. Later studies based on household survey data found lower income elasticities 
and lower price elasticities than the aggregate studies (Green & Malpezzi, 2003). Second, 
                                                 
74 The quality controlled housing price and rental index are also unavailable. 
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the demand elasticity in China75 is in the middle level compared with other developing 
countries. Malpezzi and Mayo (1987) estimated demand elasticities for 16 cities in eight 
developing countries. They found the owner elasticities ranging from 0.17 to 1.11, and 
renter elasticities ranging from 0.33 to 0.88. However, Malpezzi and Mayo (1987) used the 
data two decades ago and might not reflect the current situation.  
 
In summary, the demand for housing in China is not only influenced by the demographics 
and incomes as in western countries, but also by the special characteristics of the China’s 
housing market, such as the commercialization of the housing. This caused the housing 
demand in China was very strong, which brought, at least partly, the high house prices. 
Besides,  the individual tenure choice is not only influenced by household characteristics 
and the housing market, which is similar with western countries, but also by factors that 
characterize the institutional relationships among households, “work units” and the 
government in China. The demand for housing is not very sensitive to the income level, 
which may cause the unmatched price compared with the income level.  The relatively low 
income and price elasticity also demonstrated that the demand is not very sensitive to the 







                                                 
75 Referring to the results of Zheng (2004), which is more reliable. 
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Appendix C Data Explanation 
 
Data sample: 50 cities 
Data frequency: annual  
Data resource: Statistics Yearbooks of various cities (1995 - 2004) 
                       China Statistics Yearbook (1995-2004)   
                       China City Statistics Yearbook (1995-2004) 
                       China Real Estate Statistics Yearbooks (2000-2004) 
                        China Population Statistics Yearbooks (2001) 
 
Floor space of Commodity houses completed: New floor space residential buildings 
completed by real estate developer every year. It refers to total floor space of all buildings 
completed in the reference period, which have come up to the designed standards and have 
been put into use.   
 
Residential buildings: Buildings used as residence by people, including dormitories fro 
family members of staff and workers, mass dormitories like those for single worker and 
students, and various apartments. The residential buildings exclude the floor space of 
basement used as air-raid shelters not for residence and apartments used as offices.  
Time period: 1995-2003  
Unit: m2 (floor space)  
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Floor space of Commodity houses under construction: Total floor space of all buildings 
under construction during the reference period, including floor space of newly started 
buildings during the reference period, floor space of construction extended from the 
previous period to the current period, and floor space of construction suspended during the 
previous period but resumed in the current period. Floor space of construction completed 
in the current period and floor space of construction started and then suspended in the 
current period are still included in floor space under construction. 
Time period: 1995-2003  
Unit: m2 (floor space)   
 
Average selling housing price: current year price which equals to total sale divided by total 
sold space, without quality control  
Time period: 1995-2003  
Unit: Chinese Yuan / m2 
 
Real estate investment: Nominal value of real estate developers’ investment in the whole 
city area including counties. Investment in Real Estate Development refers to the 
investment by the real estate development companies and other real estate development 
units of various types of ownership in the construction of buildings (residential and non 
residential) . It is finished work in monetary terms. 
 
Time period: 1995-2003 
Unit: Chinese Yuan 
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City Real estate investment: Nominal value of real estate developers’ investment including 
non residential investment in the central city area excluding counties 
Time period: 1995-2003 
Unit: Chinese Yuan 
 
Residential investment among fixed asset investment: Nominal value of residential 
investment within the total fixed asset investment of the whole city including counties. 
Total Investment in Fixed Assets refers to the volume of activities in construction and 
purchases of fixed assets in monetary terms. It is a comprehensive indicator which shows 
the size, pace, proportional relations and use orientation of the investment in fixed assets. 
Time period: 1995-2001 
Unit: Chinese Yuan 
 
Residential investment among real estate investment: Nominal value of residential 
investment within the real estate investment of the whole city including counties. 
Time period: 2001, 2002 
Unit: Chinese Yuan 
 
Living space per capita: Average floor space each urban resident can use. It equal to total 
residential using space divided by total number of residents. 
Time period: 1998-2003 
Unit: m2  
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Gross Domestic Product: The final products at market prices produced by all resident units 
in a country (or a region) during a certain period of time. 
 
Total GDP: Nominal Gross Domestic Production of whole city including counties, 
measured in actual price. 
Time period: 1994-2003 
Unit: Chinese Yuan  
 
City GDP: Nominal Gross Domestic Production of central city excluding counties, 
measured in actual price. 
Time period: 1994-2003 
Unit: Chinese Yuan 
 
GDP growth index: every year’s GDP growth rate compared with previous year, which is 
calculated with comparable price (usually the price of 1990)  
Time period: 1994-2003 
 
Comparable Prices: prices that are used to remove the factors of price change in 
calculating economic aggregates, so as to facilitate comparison of aggregates over time. 
Two methods are used for calculating economic aggregates at comparable prices, a) 
Multiplying the output of products by their constant prices of certain year; b) Deflation of 
data at current prices by relevant price index. 
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Actual Price (current year price): The actual prices during the reference period, i.e. ex-
factory prices of industrial products, purchasing prices of farm products, retail prices, etc, 
reflecting the actually happening in current year, joining various statistical indicators on 
national economic, general balance among production, circulation, distribution and 
consumption. 
 
Average Annual Growth Rate: Two methods for calculating average annual growth rate are 
applied in China, one is often called "level approach", or the method of calculating 
geometric average, which is derived by comparing the level of the last year of the interval 
with that of the beginning year. The average annual growth rate listed in this dataset are 
calculated by "level approach".  
 
Total FDI: Foreign Direct Investment of whole city including counties. Foreign Direct 
Investment refers to the investment inside China by foreign funded and Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan funded enterprises, economic organizations or individuals, following 
the relevant policies and laws of China. 
Time period: 1994-2003 
Unit: US dollar  
 
City FDI: Foreign Direct Investment of central city excluding counties 
Time period: 1994-2003 (8 data is absent) 
Unit: US dollar  
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Disposable income per capita: average nominal disposable income of each in the city area, 
which derived from Disposable Income of Urban Households. Disposable Income of 
Urban Households refers to the disposable income of the sample households, including 
those which can be used for final expenditure and other non-obligation expenditure and 
savings. It is the difference of total income minus income tax, expenditure for social 
security and subsidies of account. The following formula is used: 
 
Disposable Income of Urban Households= Total Income-Income Tax-Expenditure for 
Social Security-Survey Subsidies. 
Time period:  1995-2003 
Unit: Chinese Yuan 
 
CPI:  Urban Consumer Price Index  
Urban Consumer Price Index reflects the trend and degree of changes in prices of 
consumer goods and services purchased by urban households. It is an indicator used for 
government decision making, price monitoring & controlling and improving the current 
national accounting system. The annual price index is used to reflect the degree of inflation 
and deflation. The survey field of urban CPI covers the prices of goods and services, which 
are purchased by urban households and used for living. It is classified into 8 categories by 
food, tobacco and use articles, clothing, household facilities and articles, repair services, 
medicine and medical articles, means of transportation and communication, recreation, 
education and culture articles, residence and services 
Time period: 1994-2003  




Total population: Registered population (excluding floating population) of the whole city 
area including counties. Registered Population refers to the population registered in public 
security organs in this area, in accordance with the regulation of the People's Republic of 
China on the Management of Registration Residence. No matter one is out or not, how 
long the time is, which is often expressed in. 
Time period: 1991-2003  
 
Total non agriculture population: Registered non agriculture population of the whole city 
area including counties. 
Time period: 1991-2003  
 
City population: Registered population (excluding floating population) of the central city 
area excluding counties. 
Time period: 1991-2003  
 
City non agriculture population: Registered non agriculture population (excluding floating 
population) of the central city area excluding counties. 
Time period: 1991-2003  
 
Education level: Percentage of people having more than 15 years schooling, which refers 
to the ratio that people who hold the degree of junior college divided by people above six 
years old. 
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Time period: 2000  
 
Land area: Land area of whole city including counties, according to the regionalism of the 
state. 
Time period: 1994-2003  
Unit: km2
 
City land area: Land area of the central city excluding counties.   
Time period: 1994-2003  
Unit: km2 
 
Developed city land area:  Land areas having been developed in a city, which refers to the 
land in administrative areas having been developed concentratedly with municipal public 
facilities. For a core city, developed areas include concentrated areas and decentralized 
areas, having basic perfect municipal public facilities; for a city with several towns, 
developed areas are composed of several concentrated areas with municipal public 
facilities. Therefore, the scope of developed areas is actual construction land areas of a city. 
Time period: 1994-2003  
Unit: km2 
 
Green area per capita: Public green area each urban resident shares, measured in square 
kilometers. 
Time period: 1997-2003  
Unit: km2 
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 Population Density:  The number of persons per square kilometers in the whole city area 
including counties, which equals to total population divided by land area. 
Time period: 1994-2003  
Unit: ten thousand persons per km2 
 
City Population Density:  The number of persons per square kilometers in the central city 
area excluding counties, which equals to the city population divided by the city land area. 
Time period: 1994-2003  
Unit: ten thousand persons per km2 
 
Location: The geographical location of a city, specified as coastal, middle or west. Two 
dummy variables were constructed to measure a city’s location. 
  
Middle: Location dummy whose value is 1 if city locates in the central area, 0, if locates in 
other area. 
 
Coastal: Location dummy whose value is 1 if city locates in the coastal area, 0, if locates in 
other area. 
 
Administration Level:  Dummy variable which value is 1 if the administration level of a 
city is province or vice province, other wise, 0. The higher the administration level a city is, 
the more the autonomy privilege a city has. 
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Among these 50 cities, Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing are four autonomous 
cities which have highest administration level and largest autonomy rights.  The capital 
cities of provinces such as Nanjing, Hangzhou and Guangzhou have lower administration 
level and relatively lower autonomy rights, comparing with the autonomous ones. Others 















Appendix D The Green, Malpezzi and Mayo Model (1999) 
 
In the first stage, Green, Malpezzi and Mayo estimated supply elasticities for 44 cities 
using time series data and following equation: 
 
pn ˆˆ Γ+=α  
where n is the number of housing units, p is housing prices and the hat notation indicates 
percentage changes.  Estimates of coefficient Γ are therefore direct estimates of supply 
elasticitiesη . 
 
Then in the second stage of analysis, they use the estimated elasticities as dependent 
variables. Following the model extended Mayer and Somerwille (1999) , the variation in 
elasticities is explained as a function of travel time, density, price, the after tax interest rate 
less the growth rate, the after-income- tax property tax rate and population. In addition, a 
dummy variable that represents the stringency of the regulatory environment is added to 
test whether it affects the elasticity significantly. The model is detailed below. 
 
Following Capozza and Helsely (1989), house rent rh depend on the opportunity cost of 
land, which reflects lot size q and agricultural land rent r a; the structure value, which is the 
product of the capital cost I and the structure cost c h; and the location rents, which are a 
function of city size b76, transport cost k and distance d from the center of the city. 
)( dbkicqrr Thah −++=  
                                                 
76 The distance is from the core to the city border. 
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New development occurs at the city border where d equals b t , d represents a certain 












where g is the growth rate of the city boundary. Rearranging as suggested by Mayer and 
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where the bar represents the time derivative.  Let nb φ=   where φ  is a factor of 
proportionality that is decreasing in density and n is the number of housing units. 
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Appendix E Supplementary Estimating of New Housing Supply 
 
Considering that more and more high rise residential buildings have been constructed in 
recent years, two supplementary estimations besides the one presented in section 4.5 are 
conducted. Both of these tests are based on the same model presented in chapter 4. 
However, different time lag factors are taken into account in these two additional tests. The 
first one uses one year lagged housing completions as the proxy of housing starts, based on 
the assumption that the housing can be completed within two years; another takes two year 
lagged housing completions as the proxy of housing starts, based on a three-year 
construction period assumption. We will focus on the analysis of the one-year lag 
estimation since the two results are quite consistent.  
 
E.1 One Year Lag Estimation 
The variable definitions and statistical description are the same with those in chapter 4 
except the dependent variable (LnC) represents the last year’s housing completion instead 
of current one.   
Four pooled regressions with different specifications about city characteristics (shown in 
Table E.1) were carried out to explore the determinants of new housing supply based on 
equation 4.11. These regressions all include the current and lagged changes in housing 
price and construction cost. Seven variables are included in different combinations to 
control the city specifics.  
z In all the four regressions, the effects of city population size, economic development, 
city density, city openness level and city location are included; however, the economic 
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development is reflected by different variables-- the real income per capita in 
regression 1 & 2 and the real GDP in regression 3 & 4; 
z The land availability (green land area per capita) is added in regression 2 and 4. 
 
Also, the possible endogeneity between construction and both current and lagged house 
prices and construction costs are considered77. However, the instrumental variables 
estimations did not make any improvement. Thus, Table E.1 only presents the estimated 
coefficients of the four pooled regressions.  
 
Except for the population density, all the other variables measuring city characteristics 
have quite a consistent effect on new housing supply in all four estimations. Population, 
income per capita, GDP, FDI, green area per capita and the location dummy all have the 
expected effect on housing construction, and these effects are all statistically significant at 
the 10% confidence level. 
 
The economic development and population size of a city tend to have the strongest positive 
effect on housing construction. Holding other variables fixed, when the disposable income 
per capita increases by 1%, new construction increases by 1.24% in regression 1; when the 
real GDP increases by 1%, as shown in regressions 3 and 4, construction increases by at 
least 0.41%. A 1% growth in population results in as high as a 1.04% increase in 
construction (as shown in regression 2).  
 
                                                 
77 One-year lagged price changes and cost changes are used as the instrumental variables of current price and 
cost changes, while two-year lagged price and cost changes as the instrumental variables for one year lagged 
price and cost changes. 
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Table E.1 Regression Results (New Housing Supply, One-year Lag) 
 
Specification Regr.(1) Regr.(2) Regr.(3) Regr.(4) 
Pooled regression         
lnPG 0.30 0.13 0.39 0.12
  (0.29) (0.32) (0.32) (0.34)
lagLnPG -0.10 -0.14 0.08 -0.10
  (0.25) (0.26) (0.27) (0.28)
lnMC -2.13 *** -2.16 ** -1.73 * -2.18 **
  (0.86 (0.93) (0.95) (1.01)
laglnMC 1.04 1.13 0.57 1.07
  (0.91) (1.00) (1.00) (1.07)
LnPOP 0.97 *** 1.04 *** 0.58 *** 0.76 ***
  (0.06 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
LnD 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.10
  (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
LnI 1.24 *** 1.11 ***   
  (0.12) (0.14)   
lnGDP   0.54 *** 0.41 ***
    (0.08) (0.09)
lnFDI  0.08 *** 0.07 ** 0.12 *** 0.10 **
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
lnGA  0.21 **  0.41 ***
   (0.11)  (0.11)
Middle -0.14 * -0.17 * -0.18 * -0.23 **
  (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10
constant -7.45 *** -7.06 ** 2.50 ** 2.19 *
  (1.41) (1.66) (1.15) (1.26)
      
R-squared 0.78 0.80 0.73 0.77
Adjusted R-squared 0.77 0.79 0.72 0.76
No. of observations 310 265 310 265
Standard errors in parentheses 
         * significant at the 10% confidence level 
         ** significant at the 5% confidence level 
         *** significant at the 1% confidence level 
 
The FDI a city received and the green land area per capita also have positive effects on 
housing construction. If a city receives 1% more FDI, construction increases by 0.07-0.12 
%. If each urban resident shares one more percent green land area, the city will see at least 
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a 0.21% (regression 2) increase in construction. Meanwhile, the city location has a 
relatively strong negative influence on housing construction. Cities located in the central 
area have at least approximately 14 % less construction than cities in the coastal or western 
regions. However, the coefficients on population density are not significant in the all 
estimations. It maybe because density is calculated as the population divided by land area, 
and these two variables have been largely reflected by the city size (population) and the 
land availability (green land per capita). Removing the density variable from the basic 
equation has little effect on other coefficients (however, the regression is not shown in the 
table E.1). 
 
Although the variables measuring city specifics perform well, the performance of current 
and lagged housing prices changes and costs changes is not quite consistent with our 
original expectations. The current changes of housing costs have negative and significant 
effects on the housing construction, as expected, but the effects of lagged housing costs’ 
change are insignificant. It is not a very surprising result since in many other empirical 
housing supply studies, the coefficients on the construction material prices were all not 
statistically different from zero. However, 1% increase on the material cost will cause at 
least 1.73% decrease in new housing supply. 
 
Moreover, the effects of current and lagged house price changes on housing construction 
are inconsistent among these four estimations (for example, the coefficients of lagged price 
changes are negative in regressions 3 but positive in others); and these effects are not 
statistically different from zero. This result is not quite consistent with Mayer and 
Somerville’s empirical work (2000a), in which price changes have a strong positive 
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relationship with housing construction. Two possible reasons for the unexpected results 
have been discussed in chapter 4, section 4.5: one is the quality of the collected housing 
price data and another is the transitional characteristics of the housing market in China.  
 
 
E.2 Two Year Lag Estimation of New Housing Supply 
 
The variable definitions and statistical description are also the same with those defined in 
chapter 4 except the dependent variable (LnC) represents the year before last year’s 
housing completion instead of current one.   
 
Similarly, four pooled regressions with the same specifications about city characteristics 
(shown in Table E.2) were carried out, also based on the equation 4.11. 
 
The empirical result is quite consistent with the test in E.1.The economic development and 
population size of a city tend to have the strongest positive effects on housing construction. 
Holding the other variables fixed, when the disposable income per capita increases by 1%, 
new construction increases by 1.15% in regression 1; when the real GDP increases by 1%, 
as shown in regressions 3 and 4, construction increases by at least 0.38%. A 1% growth in 
population results in as high as a 1.07% increase in construction (as shown in regression 2).  
 
housing construction. If a city receives 1% more FDI, construction increases by 0.07-0.11 
%. If each urban resident shares one more percent green land area, the city will see at least 
a 0.23% (regression 2) increase in construction. The city location has a relatively strong 
negative influence on housing construction. Cities located in the central area have at least 
approximately 15 % less construction than cities in the coastal or western regions. 
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Table E.2 Regression Results (New Housing Supply, Two-year Lag) 
 
Specification Regr.(1) Regr.(2) Regr.(3) Regr.(4) 
Pooled regression         
lnPG 0.33 0.11 0.41 0.10
  (0.31) (0.34) (0.34) (0.36)
lagLnPG 0.07 -0.06 0.24 -0.02
  (0.27) (0.28) (0.29) (0.30)
lnMC -2.37 *** -2.42 ** -2.00 ** -2.45 **
  (0.93) (1.01) (1.00) (1.07)
laglnMC 1.30 1.43 0.86 1.38
  (0.98) (1.08) (1.06) (1.14)
LnPOP 0.99 *** 1.07 *** 0.64 *** 0.81 ***
  (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09)
LnD 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.13
  (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
LnI 1.15 *** 1.01 ***   
  (0.12) (0.15)   
lnGDP   0.49 *** 0.38 ***
    (0.09) (0.09)
lnFDI  0.08 ** 0.07 * 0.11 *** 0.09 **
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
lnGA  0.23*  0.39 ***
   (0.12)  (0.11)
Middle -0.15 * -0.23 ** -0.18 ** -0.29 **
  (0.08) (0.10 (0.09) (0.11)
constant -7.24 *** -6.77 *** 2.38 ** 2.19 *
  (1.52) (1.79) (1.22) (1.32)
      
R-squared 0.75 0.77 0.71 0.75
Adjusted R-squared 0.74 0.76 0.70 0.74
No. of observations 310 265 310 265
Standard errors in parentheses 
         * significant at the 10% confidence level 
         ** significant at the 5% confidence level 





The FDI a city received and the green land area per capita also have positive effects on  
Besides, the current changes of housing costs also have negative and significant effects on 
the housing construction, but the effects of lagged housing costs’ change are insignificant. 
The effects of current and lagged house price changes on housing construction are 
inconsistent and these effects are not statistically different from zero. 
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